THE CASE AGAINST RECOGNIZING RED CHINA
STANLEY K. HORNBECK, onetime chief of the State Department's Office of Far Eastern Affairs in FOREIGN AFFAIRS:
THERE is little or no warrant for believing that our recognition of the Central People's [i.e., Chinese Communist] Government would cause the Communist world or any part of it to modify its over-all objectives and thus resolve or diminish the ultimate cause of tensions in Asia. The net effect probably would be to increase the self-confidence, the will to conquer, and the capabilities of the Soviet-Communist empire. Those who think otherwise would do well to review our recognition of the Soviet Government, and British recognition of the Central People's Government. The Soviet Government gave promises — to desist, to refrain, to perform and to permit. Which of its promises has the Soviet Union honored? In what respect have its Communist rulers altered their over-all objectives?
The United Kingdom transferred its recognition from China's National Government to the newly established Central People's Government in 1950, without trading and on a basis of wishful assumption and trustful hope. In what respect has Communist China altered its objectives or shown itself to have been affected for the better by that gesture of confidence? Has the United Kingdom succeeded in exercising a "restraining influence?" The Central People's Government has snubbed the United Kingdom officially, confiscated British properties, destroyed British business and abused British nationals.
Nor is there warrant for the contention that recognition of the Central People's Government would give American policy-makers and negotiators greater latitude for manoeuvre, greater freedom of choice. It presumably would relieve the United States of some commitments, momentarily embarrassing, to the National Government; it would reduce at least one of the areas of discord between the United States and some of its allies; and it would satisfy at least one of the demands of the Communist world. But it simultaneously would enmesh the United States in commitments to a government hostile to the free world and party to the conspiracy which seeks to destroy it. In total effect it would reduce rather than enlarge the area wherein American policy-makers are free to make choices.
Recognition of the Central People's Government by the United States would presumably be followed promptly by its admission to the United Nations. Were this accompanied by the ejection of the National Government, it would mean one more delegation contributing to the Soviet-directed Communist effort in that forum and one less on the side of the free world.
One lesson should be learned: the Communist world will bargain, but Soviet Communist over-all policy is not for sale and cannot be purchased. Promises, yes; but abandonment of purposes, no. Change of heart, perhaps some day and for some reason, but not in return for "concessions" or to honor promises. In no transaction should the United States rob Peter to pay Paul. At no time should the United States think it possible to buy Communist basic policy.
A GOVERNMENT'S RIGHT TO DEMAND INFORMATION
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