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Flexed Muscles. "There are really no absolute limitations," said Charlie Wilson, "on our ability to produce in peace or war. The limitations are relative ones—the relation of manpower and materials and facilities and electric power to one another." In the relation of all these things to one another, in 1950, the U.S. was better off than it had ever been. The booming economy was a bright contrast to the rusty industrial machine, full of depression's cobwebs, with which the U.S. had entered World War II. Items:
¶ In steel, the basic sinew of war, the U.S. had a capacity of 100,500,000 tons a year (about 12% more than World War II's peak), and was expanding by 9,500,000 more tons.
¶ In chemicals, the U.S. had almost doubled its capacity since war's end.
¶ In electric power, the $8.6 billion poured out to expand since 1945 had increased capacity 38%.
¶ In rubber, the U.S. had $780 million worth of synthetic plants which did not even exist when World War II began. By mid-1951 they will be producing some 900,000 tons a year (v. World War II's peak of 820,000 tons). Said B. F. Goodrich's President John L. Collyer: "With synthetic and stockpiled natural rubber, the U.S. has enough to meet all military demands for a five-year war and still have enough for essential civilian uses."
Nevertheless, until output was stepped up, the U.S. faced grave shortages in such metals as aluminum, copper, nickel, cobalt, etc., whose production was not yet up to World War II's level.
The U.S., which had to spend $12.7 billion to build new plants during World War II, still had a reserve of 450 plants to put back into defense production. There was no argument, as there had been in the early days of World War II, over the need for further industrial expansion. At year's end businessmen, who had spent $83 billion on expansion in five years (including $18 billion in 1950), planned to expand even faster in 1951 by spending $5 billion in the first quarter alone.
The Men. In manpower, the U.S. was slightly ahead of World War II. The potential labor force was 66 million v. World War II's peak of 65 million. But the difference was more than in quantity. It was also in quality. The U.S. had an immense, immeasurable reserve in war production know-how stored in the heads and hands of millions of workers and thousands of vigorous, tough-minded executives who had learned the production tricks during World War II.