It had been an extraordinary fortnight in the air over North Africa. The sky, except for a few rude little patches, belonged to the Allies. Across its trackless terrain thundered all the fine names—the Flying Fortresses, Halifaxes, Wellingtons, Liberators, Bisleys, Mitchells, Bostons, Marauders, Baltimores, Lightnings, Spitfires, Beaufighters, Hurri-bombers, Aira-cobras, Kittyhawks, Warhawks. But though the aerial terrain was trackless, the pattern of the thunder was very exact, very formal—and very effective.
The pattern was developed, to a large extent, by the British Air Command in the Middle East—notably Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder and Air Vice Marshal Arthur Coningham. Its essence was the division of air forces into two parts, tactical and strategic. The tactical part, consisting of fighters, fighter-bombers, light and medium bombers, became in effect a weapon of the advancing army; it was used specifically and with terrifying concentration against the enemy army and its retreating and rear elements. The strategic part, consisting of heavy bombers, was used against the enemy's supply lines and extreme rear bases.
This double use of air power was not suddenly invented in the last fortnight. It was in evidence at El Alamein. It had been developing for a long time, ever since the inferior Allies had withdrawn on many fronts under Stuka harassment. It was an elaboration of German methods (which have long stressed the tactical air force) and an amalgam of U.S. and British methods.
It is the thing which will crack Rommel when he digs in. And it will be more decisive than the bombing of Europe (see p. 31). This is how it worked in & around Tunisia:
Tactical Force. When General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery saw his early frontal attacks on the Mareth Line at Wadi Zig-zau fail, and saw his small flanking movement headed for El Hamma begin to succeed, he said: "Let's reinforce success." He pulled out much of his armor and more infantry and poured them south on a series of forced and camouflaged marches by night. The force made an extraordinary 200-mile dash across desert as trackless as the sky, building its own dust storms. Armor and the truck convoys made the whole desert stink like a garage, according to one of the men who went along.
Rommel, who is never blind, sensed the move and shifted a Panzer division to El Hamma. The flankers, men whom Montgomery had used before for shock jobs—the 2nd New Zealanders under Lieut. General Sir Bernard C. Freyberg—drew themselves up for attack. Then, on a Friday afternoon at 4 p.m., came a violent and perfect expression of the use of tactical air force.
At that zero hour almost the entire number of light and medium aircraft assembled by the Allies in North Africa concentrated on the tight area near El Hamma where Rommel had his 88-mm. guns, his armor, and his Italians. Before each stick of bombs hit the earth, new sticks, and after them still other sticks, left the bomb bays. The bombardment lasted two and a half hours. Artillery chimed in toward the end, and when the bayonets finally slit forward, there was nothing left that could be called resistance.