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He knew the combat records of the members of the J.C.S.: himself, General Hoyt Vandenberg, who had commanded the Ninth Air Force in Europe, the Army's General J. Lawton Collins, who had commanded the VII Corps at Normandy. Then he got in a low blow: "I was not associated with Admiral Denfeld during the war. I am not familiar with his experiences . . . [Denfeld, by order of his superiors, spent most of the war in Washington as Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel]. Undoubtedly it was because of this record that he was appointed Chief of Naval Operations."
"Fancy Dans." The admirals had said that the Navy's power and prestige were being "nibbled to death" and that their service's morale was being wrecked. Replied Bradley sharply: "Senior officers decrying the low morale of their forces evidently do not realize that the esprit of the men is but a mirror of their confidence in their leadership." As for admirals risking their careers to carry their case to the public, Bradley snapped: "I would like to offer some impartial advice to all aspiring martyrs: to be successful in a sacrifice, he must be 100% right . . . His sacrifice must be for the good of the entire nation . . ."
The crux of the whole matter, as he saw it, was: many in the Navy were "completely against unity of command and planning . . . Despite protestations to the contrary, I believe that the Navy has opposed unification from the beginning . . . This is no time," he went on sternly, "for 'fancy Dans' who won't hit the line with all they have on every play, unless they can call the signals ... I believe that the public hearing of the grievances of a few officers who will not accept the decisions of the authorities established by law . . . have done infinite harm to our national defense."
The Balance of the Bomb. When Omar Bradley finished his biting, indignant statement there was stunned silence in the committee room. In charging head down into the middle of the scrimmage he had given a final, climactic exhibition of the unseemly personal antagonisms which had split the nation's military chiefs. From a military standpoint he had all but blasted the Navy admirals' case. And before the week was out, torpedoed by the testimony of other non-Navy men, the Navy's arguments were little more than just afloat.
Was it true that the Air Force, with its $1.4 billion B-36 program, was "putting all its eggs in one basket?" General Hoyt Vandenberg, Air Force chief, answered with figures. B-36s, he said, comprised only 5% (four groups) of the total of regular military aircraft. The Air Force also had eleven groups of other bombers (about 330 B-29s and B-50s), and some 33 groups of heavy and medium reconnaissance, fighter, troop carrier and other miscellaneous aircraft.
Said Vandenberg: the nation had to "counterbalance the potential enemy's masses of ground troops . . . No such balancing factor exists other than strategic bombing, including the atomic bomb."
The Air Force's Secretary W. Stuart Symington backed up Vandenberg, and deplored the whole public airing of the country's military doctrines. "Lightning Joe" Collins denied any Army plot to swallow up the Navy's Marine Corps as had been charged in the Navy's case.