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Against such defenses, the typical blitz—the quick shock, the breakthrough, the spearing advance by planes, tanks and mobile artillery, then the followup by infantry—will not serve as it did in Poland, in the Lowlands, in Russia's first months. Now, in depth and thorough preparation, the Russian defenses are stronger than those which slowed the Nazi drive last fall, then stopped it with winter's paralyzing help. But, if Stalin and his staff have learned how to crack the 1940-model blitz. Hitler's generals have had many months to study Soviet defense. Moscow's hardheaded commanders can only assume that the Germans have a plan, that the plan is ready, that it is in scale with the German task.
The German armies, in their preparatory spring attacks, have already shown a few new tricks. Essence of these new tactics is to choose a very narrow sector, smash the selected area with a maximum concentration of planes (the Russians counted 1,000 on a 15-mile line below Kharkov), then strike with closely integrated formations of artillery, infantry and tanks. Full-strength Panzers have not attempted to dart through the enemy lines, swirl at will in the Russian rear. Instead, the Germans apparently keep their tanks in smaller groups, close to artillery and infantry. Thus, while the German pace may be slow, it is calculated to keep concentrated columns intact, always with enough strength to protect themselves from the surrounding Russians. At Kharkov these tactics worked so well that Moscow had to admit a continued Nazi advance. At Sevastopol the Germans' brute concentration of men & metal brought that fortress to the verge of collapse in 16 days.
It is possible that the recent variations in German tactics have been merely a change of pace, perhaps partly caused by the desire to husband tanks. Considering the size of the battlefield and the size of the Russian armies—and the tendency shown in every previous campaign in World War II for General Halder to lay plans on a grand scale—the Nazi plan for 1942 may well call for break-throughs and encirclements on a huge scale.
There are many opportunities for such attacks (see map). A major drive in the center might take Moscow and, sweeping on, outflank the entire southern front. A major drive in the south may strike directly at the Caucasus or swing north to outflank the central front. A drive in the far north might cut the lines of Allied aid from Murmansk and Archangel. A major drive through or around Turkey may cut off the Russian back door through Persia or swing south to attack Suez.
There are possible variations upon these themes. Several such drives may be launched at once, some of them real, some feints. Any two adjoining drives can become a pincers movement. Whatever the plan, it is certain to be breathtaking.
The Planner Is Ready. Adolf Hitler tells the German Army, Air Force and Navy where to fight. Sometimes he tells them when to fight. But General Halder and his small, thoroughly professional group of aides tell them how to fight.