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Washington and Moscow. In Washington last week arrived Japan's new Ambassador, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, who had been greeted warmly in Hawaii by Admiral James 0. Richardson, but had found his reception chillier as he traveled east. President Roosevelt greeted him as "my old friend," but wore an air of utmost gravity. At his press conference the President made no effort to conceal the seriousness of U. S.-Japanese relations. The U. S., he indicated, might be "forced" into war in the Pacific. Yet how much it would take to force the U. S. into war, even the President probably did not know, and, if he did, he would not tell Japan.
To the Japanese Diet Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka made a highly significant remark. In the event of a break between Japan and the U. S., said he, Russia would be taken care of by "prompt and effective steps." Talky Yosuke Matsuoka went on to explain that Japan's opposition to the extension of Communism in China had been an obstacle to a non-aggression pact with Russia, left his listeners to infer that if the U. S. got tough, Japan would give in on this point. In Moscow Japan's new Ambassador to
Germany, Lieut. General Hiroshi Oshima, stopped off for two days of intensive diplomatic activity with the Japanese Ambassador to Russia, Lieut. General Yoshitsugu Tatekawa, and with the German and Italian Ambassadors, Count Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg and Augusto Rosso. That the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis was bent on taking Russia into camp was plain. Before leaving for his post in Berlin, General Oshima beamed at correspondents and murmured: "Close Soviet-Japanese relations are . . . necessary to facilitate the construction of a new world order."
Too Far and Too Late. At week's end, general feeling in the Far East was that the scare had been a trial balloon, sent up to find out how Japan's potential foes would act. It was not quite so simple as that.
The words of Japanese spokesmen were full of meaning, in their contradictions as well as their consistencies. For the Cabinet, Spokesman Ko Ishii purred: "We do not see the imminence of war in the Pacific." For the Army,. Major Kunio Akiyama barked: "Japan will not disturb the waves of the Pacific, but if strong pressure is applied she will be compelled to take certain measures." For the chauvinists, Tokyo Kokumin shrilled that U. S. activity in the Pacific was "approaching a state of war." For the realists, Japanese correspondents in French Indo-China stated: "Japan will move against Anglo-American interests in the Orient and the Dutch East Indies, first attacking Singapore."
Japan, like the U. S., was committed to a policy. Japan, like the U. S., was reluctant to follow it to war. But, as Kokumin said, Admiral Nomura's mission to "Washington had come too late: the two countries had gone too far. Japanese believed that the year 2602 would see Japan ruling one of the earth's richest dominions or returning to the way of her gods.