The U.S. State Department spelled out the reasons last week why UNO could not admit Franco Spain. Fifteen documents recovered from Axis secret diplomatic files proved that Francisco Franco had been an even closer ally of Hitler than the world had supposed.
Fascist Bargains. On Aug. 15, 1940, Franco wrote Benito Mussolini: "Since the beginning of the present conflict it has been our intention to make the greatest efforts in our preparations in order to enter the foreign war at a favorable opportunity. . . ."
A little more than a month later he addressed a long letter to Hitler begging for guns. Said he: "The first act in our attack must consist in the occupation of Gibraltar. For our part we have been preparing the operation in secret for a long time. . . . My unchangeable and sincere adherence to you personally, to the German people, and to the cause for which you fight. I hope, in defense of this cause, to be able to renew the old bonds of comradeship between our armies."
Dr. Eberhard von Stohrer, German ambassador at Madrid, reported that Franco's price was Gibraltar, French Morocco and the Oran section of Algeria, plus military and economic assistance.
Hitler grumbled to the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Galeazzo Ciano, that the Spanish terms were high, and that whenever during the Civil War he asked for repayment from the Spaniards for his help they promptly transferred the conversation to high, idealistic grounds. He growled: "As a German one feels toward the Spanish almost like a Jew who wants to make business out of the holiest possessions of mankind."
Spain, argued the Führer then and in later letters, must come in without conditions. Wrote he: "For about one thing, Caudillo, there must be a clarity: we are at this time fighting a battle of life and death and cannot at this time make any gifts." Franco drew himself up, replied: "I stand ready at your side, entirely and decidedly at your disposal, united in a common historical destiny, desertion from which would mean my suicide and that of the cause which I have led and represent in Spain."
Democracy's Dilemma. The evidence was strong but it merely served to prove what everybody knew: that Franco was an Axis stooge. Spaniards, sick of civil war, were not going to rise against him because of the U.S. disclosures. The question was: what were the Allied governments going to do about it? France, Britain and the U.S. issued a note expressing hope that "patriotic and liberal-minded Spaniards" may soon find the means to bring about "a peaceful withdrawal of Franco, the abolition of Falange, the establishment of an interim or caretaker government. . . ." Beyond that, there was only a vague threat to sever diplomatic relations, a promise that "there is no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Spain."