(2 of 3)
Yamamoto then urged Kurusu not to break off matters pertaining to the matrimonial question.
Kurusu: Not break them? You mean talks? Oh, my!
Yamamoto: Regarding the matrimonial question. I shall send you another message.
Kurusu: But without anything—they want me to keep carrying on the matrimonial question? In the meantime we're faced with having a child born. On top of that, Tokugawa [code for the Jap Army] is champing at the bit, isn't he? . . . That's why I doubt if anything can be done.
Yamamoto: Well, we can't sell a mountain [code for: we can't yield].
Kurusu: Oh sure, I know that. ... In any event, Miss Kimiko is leaving town tomorrow and will remain in the country until Wednesday.
Yamamoto: In today's talk, there wasn't anything special then?
Kurusu: No, nothing of particular interest except that it is quite clear now that that southward—ah—the south, the south matter is having considerable effect. [This was a reference to Jap troops in French Indo-China.]
Yamamoto: I see. Well, then, goodbye.
Rupture. A day later Tokyo virtually admitted (in another code) that all negotiations were at an end: "Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts . . . but the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them [i.e., Roosevelt & Hull] that you are awaiting instructions. . . . Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but. . . ."
On Dec. 1, the messages showed, the Jap Embassy received instructions on how to destroy codes and other confidential material. On Dec. 2, Washington intercepted a message from Canton to Tokyo: "If hostilities are to begin, we here are all prepared."
Patently official Washington had known that the outbreak of war was just a matter of days. Army Intelligence even intercepted a garbled message from Tokyo to Bangkok which said: "X-Day is the 8th and the day on which the notice is to be given is the 7th."
In all the intercepted messages there were numerous references to possible points where hostilities might break out: Indo-China, Siam, new theaters in China. There were only a few slight hints that Hawaii was considered. On Nov. 29, Tokyo had cabled its consulate in Honolulu: "We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements." And on Dec. 6 Honolulu cabled back to Tokyo: "The following ships were observed at anchor—nine battleships, three light cruisers, three submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition there were four light cruisers, two destroyers lying at docks. . . ."
Tension. Beyond the facts brought out by the intercepted messages, the first four days of the hearing developed almost nothing new. Ex-Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, who had made the first report on the disaster, snorted that nothing had so far been brought out which he did not know.