What does it all add up to? Is San Francisco building the next generation's freedom from war? Or is the conference merely a jealous game of power, a dusty finish for the hopes and sacrifices of millions? Of a thousand answers, one of the best balanced and shrewdest is that of Netherlands Foreign Minister Eelco vanKleffens. After talking to him, TIME Correspondent Max Ways wrote:
Van Kleffens' clear, calm blue eyes are easy to settle where great powers look at this conference with a passionate hope for its success and a practical Dutchman's knowledge that faith did not save Rotterdam.
"As Far As We Can." He is one of the best informed diplomats in San Francisco. What his big pink ears miss, his long pink nose scents. His nation has a direct interest in most of the major San Francisco issues. An empire, it is concerned with trusteeships and dependent peoples. A small nation, it must rely on collective security and therefore opposes the one-power veto. Lying on the western (and weaker) side of the new Europe (see The Nations), it has an intense interest in "regionalism." As a conspicuously civilized state, it seeks to vitalize the charter with the concept of justice. From every Dutch viewpoint, Van Kleffens has cause to be discouraged at what is not happening in San Francisco. And yet—
"We will go as far as we can here. Later we will try to go farther. We have no choice but to support whatever degree of world organization, no matter how small, the great nations will permit. In spite of all the bitter, tragic lessons, the great powers prefer to rely on their own strength rather than upon world government. If they will not move from that position, can I push them?"
His greatest concern is this:
"The world expects too much from San Francisco. Dumbarton Oaks was hailed as proof that the great powers would enter an international organization. The real significance of Dumbarton Oaks was that the great powers would go only the smallest way in that direction. Make this clear, lest we defeat our purpose by giving the impression that we are doing more than we are."
Regions v. the World. For Van Kleffens, the one-power veto symbolizes the weakness of the emergent organization:
"It is not necessary to form an organization to protect the strong from the weak. Under the veto arrangement this organization will be unable to protect the weak from the strong. There are two other kinds of disputes: those between little states and those between great states. This organization may settle disputes between small states, which in any case do not line up behind the disputants. In disputes between great states, the Security Council will be shackled by the veto power.
"On one point I insist: there should be no veto power against the Council naming an aggressor. There should be no veto power on sanctions against an aggressor—but even if we must accept the veto there, against reason, it is fundamental that the voice of the organization be able to speak to the peoples of the world on the naming of an aggressor.