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But he cast no aspersions on the Nazis' courage: "No one in his senses would call the Germans cowards as long as they've got their machines." And he paid his tribute to the efficacy of their dirty fighting: "The Germans have been brought up to be nasty to people. We've been brought up to be gentlemen, and that's been a handicap to us in fighting this war. We've got to learn to give up being gentlemen for the duration."
Schooling in the Desert. Coningham learned a good deal from the desert Luftwaffe. He learned more from his own experiments. He learned something about the relation of tactics to overall strategy from the brilliant strategic mind of prim, quiet Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder (now Eisenhower's Deputy Commander in Chief), top Allied air commander in the Mediterranean theater when the Germans were finally cleared out of Africa.
Coningham invented the tactic of sending out small bomber formations with inordinately powerful fighter escorts—e.g., 80 fighters for 18 bombers. The escorts would so chew up the enemy fighter strength that smaller escorts were enough for protection thereafter, and bomber missions could be multiplied.
One thing Coningham learned in Africa was that an air force can be too air-minded. The Luftwaffe itself was ground-minded, completely controlled by Rommel, who tied it close to his artillery and tanks. On the other hand, Coningham's friendly and sometimes casual get-togethers with ground commanders were too loose. He went after closer integration (he dislikes the word "cooperation") with the ground forces, got it through Monty, with whom he ate, alongside whom he set up his quarters. It was Monty who uttered the doctrine: "We have one plan, one idea in mind. There is no army on one hand and air force on the other. We work as a unit."
Both he and Coningham soon agreed on a further principle which put them ahead of the German tactics: though a tactical air force must be integrated with the ground forces, it must not be tied in piecemeal lots to ground units. Its function was massed, theater-wide blows, deep penetrations to fill the gap between tactical and strategic operations. Tactical planes were even used to cut off the enemy's Mediterranean Sea traffic.
Completing the Alphabet. General Eisenhower took over three separate U.S. and R.A.F. tactical air forces in North Africa. He soon made them one, and put Coningham in command. Long before, grinning and folding his hairy arms on his chest, Coningham had said: "The Germans know war from A to about Y. They don't know Z." Now he proceeded to teach them something about Z.
Rommel had a concentration of guns, armor and Italians at El Hamma. Coningham turned loose nearly every medium and light bomber in North Africa on the still-cocky Nazi. For two and a half hours, sticks of bombs were continuously in the air. At the end of the breakthrough and the pursuit, Rommel had lost 300 tanks and vehicles, and his armored back was finally broken.
More light on Z followed for the Germans when Coningham again used his whole force to bomb Tunis. It was the payoff. Tunis surrendered in 48 hours. He considers this his best tactical performance up to the Normandy invasion.