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items of war are out of proportion to the U.S. ability to put fighting armies on fighting fronts. Furthermore, it is apparently the considered opinion of the U.S. High Command that the total of British troops, equipment and shipping available for continental action is not enough for a second front without great assistance from the U.S. All this does not mean that the Allies cannot open a second front this year. It does indicate that when Churchill and Roosevelt promised to act in time to help Russia, they did not expect a crisis before September or October.
¶ Hitler is ready. Or so, at least, the Allies must assume. Last week Nazi Elite Guards and a two-mile column of tanks, troop-carriers and artillery paraded down the Champs-Elysees in Paris. Dr. Goebbels practically invited British and U.S. troops ("those MacArthurs") to invade coastal Europe (see col. j). D.N.B. reported in fearsome detail the strength, depth and impregnability of the Nazi's coast defenses. With all of these noises the Germans were cooking propaganda. But R.A.F. reconnaissance, R.A.F. losses over northern France and underground reports from Occupied Europe all attest to strong German armies waiting in western Europe, a 25-mile layer of heavy guns, pillboxes and concrete fortresses along the Channel coast, air and armored forces waiting at central points to rush to any invasion sector. Germany's "Commander in the West," tough, wrinkled Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, unquestionably had real and formidable defenses to inspect when he toured them last week.
¶ Hitler is forearmed. He knows that the main blow of any full-scale invasion must fall somewhere between Brest and Den Helder, where The Netherlands had its chief naval base (see map, p. jo). Over the area where they first seek an invasion bridgehead, the Allies must have absolute command of the air. They must be able to cover the invasion with fighters based on Britain, and the actual offensive radius of Britain's fighter squadrons is much less than most people suppose—about 100 miles. Only the fortified stretch of German Europe along the Channel, the near Atlantic and the North Sea is within that radius.
¶ The limitations on all-out invasion do not eliminate an Allied gamble for Norway. By risking the aircraft carriers now available to them in the Atlantic, Britain and the U.S. might cover initial landings, the seizure of a few airdromes, the quick delivery of enough land-based fighters to hold the air over northern Norway while troops tried to secure a real hold. If successful, the Allies could then break Germany's air grip on the convoy route to Murmansk and Archangel, perhaps compel a major German diversion from Russia's northern fronts. If they failed—and the odds against final success would be great —they might still upset the Nazis enough to increase the chances of success along the invasion coast nearer Britain.
Whose Hell Is Paved? Last week, in a Parliament hungry for the evidence and promise of action, Sir Stafford Cripps turned on the Government's critics and cried that only Hitler would be served if the Allies revealed their intentions. "But," said Sir Stafford to a persistent baiter, "I can say that we have intentions."