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The problem is largely naval. Overland routes through this whole territory are utterly impassable. Formidable mountain ranges tumble down from the Himalayas. Thick jungles, swampy lowlands, torrential rivers, horrible rains, clouds of malarial mosquitoes—all make land attack out of the question. Furthermore, the problem narrows down for practical purposes to one of covering distances between naval bases (marked on the map by the flags of the nations to which they belong) and storming of a handful of coastal towns: Balikpapan, Tarakan, Batavia, Surabaya, Macassar, Singapore and a few others.
The problem of distances can be judged by the fact that if a map of the U. S. were superimposed on the map overleaf it would just about cover the area shown. Roughly Rangoon would correspond to Seattle, Guam to Boston, Sumatra to Southern California, and Florida to New Guinea. The distance from the Japanese naval base on Hainan to the heart of Borneo approximates the air distance from Fargo, N. Dak. to New Orleans, and the distance from Singapore to Manila that from Salt Lake City to Detroit.
At the top of the map are Japan's advance bases for the push—Formosa, which Japan won from China in 1895, and Hainan, which she grabbed early last year. But before these bases could become really effective, the Japanese would have to erase the British outpost of Hong Kong. This harbor, which has the unmatchable beauty of an intimate Rio de Janeiro, was to be the base of Britain's preliminary delaying action. Now, it is almost completely surrounded by Japanese land and naval positions. The British last summer revised their plans to resist there. Most of their revised plans at Hong Kong called for resistance only to inflict as much damage and save as much face as possible.
Next task of an attack from the north is to neutralize the flanks for a southwesterly drive. Northern French Indo-China has been penetrated economically and to a large extent militarily merely by bluff, following the fall of France. By a combination of bluff and force, it appeared easy to subdue the only other important Indo-Chinese ports: Cam-ranh Bay, which is not so strong as the French had advertised, and Saigon, which is negligible. The Japanese have already softened up Thailand by an appeal to racism—and might be further bribed by the return of Siamese territory now incorporated in Indo-China. Burma across the way, recently made to bristle with R. A. F. land ing fields (military and naval airfields indicated by red and white windsocks, commercial airfields by blue and white), would probably have to be left until later; but in any case it is on the wrong side of the peninsula for naval action.
On the other flank of an attack from the north lie the Philippines. The Japanese would be crazy to attack them before 1946, when promised Philippine independence would make penetration almost automatic. They have already invaded Mindanao with brigades of civilians and regiments of cheap products. A tight submarine ring might suffice to hold in the small U. S. squadron. based on Manila. East of the Philippines the Japanese already have bases in the mandated islands at Saipan, Rota, Yap, Palau.