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Union Now. So anxious are the small nations of Europe to stay at peace and keep what trade they have, that by last fortnight the way had been prepared for a tacit European federation—embracing all but the Allies, the Low Countries, and Turkey. Undemocratic, a brotherhood of fear, it represented the antithesis of what the democracies hope will emerge from the war, and had in it the seeds of defeat for the Allies. The Balkan nations had little choice in the matter. The great cereal bowl of the Danube sends Germany in peacetime some 50% of its produce, and though blockade and winter have so far hampered movement, the German demand has greatly increased since war began. Almost exclusively agricultural, the Balkans depend in turn on Germany for industrial goods. Every Balkan nation lives in fear of some sort of revisionist aggression. Caught in a triangle more tragic than any dramatist could invent, Central Europe depends on Germany, fears Russia, looks to Italy for police protection. After the Finnish collapse, Scandinavia too fell under the strategic hegemony of the totalitarian powers.
To capitalize on the possibility for such a convenient brand of European federation, Hitler invited Il Duce to Brennero fortnight ago. There are good grounds to believe that Herr Hitler proposed:
> Reaffirmation of the Axis.
> The inclusion of Russia in Axis arrangements through Germany, without a direct Italian-Russian Pact, which Catholic Italy would certainly not tolerate.
>In the event all peace moves fail, Germany to attack at her own discretion as to time and place. Italy to remain neutral until such time as she thinks she can deliver a coup de grace on behalf of Germany.
>Italy to receive (eventually) Russian coal and oil via Germany, and German coal to the full capacity of rail and sea routes.
>The Balkan status quo to be preserved unless the Allies open a campaign in which case Germany and Russia would try to stop the Allies by invading Rumania, eventually partitioning that country with Hungary and Bulgaria. Italy to be permitted to move into Yugoslavia to guarantee a 100% Italian Adriatic.
> Germany and Italy to try to woo Turkey away from the Allies.
> Germany, Russia and Italy to act in tight, self-interested entente at the peace conference after the war, no matter which side wins.
> Japan to be assisted.
> Emissaries to be sent at once to all Europe's neutrals to try to sell them this plan.
What Mussolini replied was not divulged. But it was very strongly hinted in Rome last week that certain of the points were distasteful to Italy, and that the whole idea of extending and bending the Axis was not well received.
Today, Tomorrow, Any Time. The pattern of Italy's future was still as obscure last week as Benito Mussolini's skill could make it. But from the doubt emerged certain strong probabilities:
> Italy would not go into the war on the side of the Allies. Her experience in and after the almost profitless last war is too vivid a memory. Besides, she has nothing to carve from Germany. If an Allied victory became probable, Italy would stay out right until the end, and then wield the nuisance value of an intact army to force general redistribution of the spoils at the peace conference.