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The worst mark against the Italian Army-is its record of disastrous defeats. Its turntail tradition goes back through the routs of Guadalajara (Spanish Civil War, 1937), Caporetto (World War, 1917), and Adowa (war against Menelek's Ethiopia in 1896). Contrary to popular tradition, cowardliness in the ranks was probably not responsible for these catastrophes. At Guadalajara the troops were green, the generalship poor, the use of motorized columns was something of an experiment. Guadalajara proved to military men everywhere (including the Italians) that motorized troops are vulnerable except on hard ground or good roads; it also taught them the formidable power of air force in connection with counteroffensive action.
The school of war may recently have improved the mediocre quality of Italian leaders. In recent years the Italians have developed at least one competent general, Marshal Badoglio who in 1935 saved the Ethiopian campaign from failure.
Balkans and Eastern Cordon. These countries divide into 1) Hungary, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, who might fight on the side of Axis; 2) Poland, Turkey, Greece and Rumania, who tentatively line up with the "stop Hitler" front. The Hungarians and Bulgars like the Germans had a Versailles gap and lack trained reserves and officers. The Yugoslavs are tough, accustomed for generations to fighting but are not well equipped. The Greek and Rumanian armies are fourth-rate and negligible. The Turks and Poles are a different story.
The Turkish army, which controls the Dardanelles and effectively blocks Germany's "Berlin-to-Bagdad" aspirations, is a first-rate, well-disciplined machine. In own bailiwick it would not easily be licked. The Poles, with good equipment for their 30 first-line divisions, and with best horse-cavalry in Europe, are well-to fight a delaying war with Germany territory in which roads are poor.
But horse soldiers are useless against machine guns if and when the Germans bring up, and Poland's poverty of resources dooms her to defeat in time unless receives effective aid which only Russia is geographically placed to give.
As it was in 1914 the Russian Army is the biggest in the world (1,800,000 men, and perhaps 10,000,000 trained reserves). But the Russian Army is a more formidable machine than it was 25 years ago. Pampered by the Kremlin, Soviet soldiers today are healthier, happier, and infinitely better-trained and officered than their Tsaristic predecessors, who were bossed by aristocrats. Whereas the soldiers of the Tsar sometimes went battle without rifles, Soviet troops have now 5,000 tanks, 1,600 pieces of artillery, some 50,000 machine-guns.
Recent purges have swept away hundreds of Russia's officers, leaving the quality of leadership of the army open to question. But the Soviet army is backed by an industrial machine such as Russia never had before and the Russian army is now a power, not just a mass, to be reckoned with.