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The weakness of even-handed embargoes is that in practice they are quite capable of working to the long term disadvantage and danger of the U. S. The weakness of embargoes against aggressor nations only is that they may lead to near-term difficulties and dangers. If the U. S. were to apply economic sanctions against Japan as an "aggressor" without first enlisting the cooperation of the British fleet and fortified Singapore Base, it would probably find itself hard put to it to keep its trade lanes open to the Malayan Archipelago, whence comes most U. S. rubber and tin. The Japanese might be provoked to raids on American shipping in the Celebes and Java seas and would probably attack the Philippines. In the event of a war along 1914-18 lines in Europe, there would be little sense in applying sanctions against Germany, which is effectively cut off from U. S. markets by British control of the sea.
Power Politics. Should Congress shut up shop and go home without passing any new neutrality legislation this summer, the previous legislation—minus "cash & carry"—will still stand. If the fight over neutrality laws is too long and too futile, a growing disgust may lead Congress and the people to wash their hands of the whole business and fall back on old-fashioned international law.
The historic neutrals might thus win a victory by default. If so, they would have to reckon with the possibility of the victory being hollow—for, as 1917 proved, no nation can be neutral if its Administration chooses to take sides, or if its people take sides. In the present pre-war world there are few conflicts in which the U. S. people are neutral at heart. Their special neutrality is a basic disinclination to commit mass murder and be its victim. But there can be no guarantee of neutrality in any words, whether of mandatory legislation or of traditional international law. Real neutrality exists in the hearts of men—and if men take sides they may fight.
In any case, the U. S. cannot make a decision of any sort that will not profoundly alter the balance of world power. With half the steel capacity of the world, with immense reserves of cotton, oil and wheat, any U. S. decision that materially limits war-time shipments would in effect alter world geography as much as if Hitler seized the Ukraine. Lesser embargoes would amount to lesser geographical rearrangement. So regardless of intention, the U. S. plays a part in power politics—with the responsibilities and the risks of a world power.