Theater of War

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Though some claimed the Spetsnaz operation was an unqualified success, the Russians have not always proved themselves adept at such rescues (see timeline). This time round, the Spetsnaz got it mostly right. Few expected the siege to end through diplomacy; the rebels had shown no interest in negotiating, and Putin would not capitulate. Nor could the timing of the special forces operation be faulted: Barayev had sworn to start killing hostages at 6 a.m. But just over an hour before the special forces stormed the hall — and about 40 minutes earlier than promised — the terrorists executed a man and a woman, according to Olga Chernyak, a journalist who was among the hostages. "I thought [the Chechens] would kill us all," she said. In the eyes of most of the surviving hostages, the soldiers were heroes.

As successful as the operation had been, some disturbing questions soon emerged. Top Kremlin aides were quoted as saying privately that they had information that the Chechens were planning four terrorist acts in Moscow this week. According to a senior Kremlin official, one attempt had been thwarted by the fsb and another misfired for unknown reasons. Why the other two attacks failed to happen is not clear.

There had been other warnings of trouble. Last month, a routine conference of Moscow college deans was told by security services to step up vigilance because the FSB believed the Chechens might attempt to blow up an educational facility. And according to a source close to Spetsnaz, the terrorists who struck in Moscow last week trained in another nearby theater in the hours just before the attack. The Kremlin is furious at the security lapses that allowed the attack to take place. One Putin administration official was quoted as suggesting that punitive action would be taken against top security officials, but that "it would be an untimely thing to do right now."

Putin has, predictably, linked the theater seizure to international terrorism. The takeover, he announced, was planned in "foreign terror centers" by the "same people" responsible for attacks like the recent bombing in Bali. That resonated well in Washington, where Putin has long argued he is fighting exactly the kind of radical Islamic terror that led to Sept. 11.

This may be smart politics, but it is bad history. The Chechens waged wars like this long before al-Qaeda, and will continue to do so regardless of how the war on terrorism turns out. This is homegrown terrorism, born in the ruins of Chechnya's cities and towns where a barbarous occupation has been unable to crush an equally savage campaign of secession. After a disastrous two-year war whose military humiliations and soaring body count nearly unseated then-President Boris Yeltsin, Russia withdrew in 1996, leaving Chechnya virtually independent. Russia stepped back in when Putin blamed Chechens for a series of 1999 Moscow apartment bombings that killed more than 300. Though some doubted that Chechens were truly responsible, Russians rallied to Putin's promise that this time the army would destroy the rebellion for good.

Last week's siege proved that the rebels were alive and well. Though the Barayev group used the tactics of international terrorism, their aims were very different — independence from Russia, not an anti-Western jihad. But al-Qaeda and the Chechen guerrilla movements may well intersect. A Saudi-born associate of Osama bin Laden named Khattab founded an organization to distribute money to the Chechen separatist cause. Khattab, who died earlier this year, reportedly assassinated by the Russians, arrived in Chechnya in 1995 when the first war against Russia was picking up steam. He was a close ally of Shamil Basayev, one of the most influential rebel commanders, whom Barayev mentioned several times last week as his leader. Thanks to Khattab's Gulf and Middle Eastern connections, he brought into Chechnya plenty of money and volunteers. In 1996, Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden's top lieutenant, was arrested in neighboring Dagestan after he tried to enter Chechnya. He was said to have been looking for a new base.

Movsar Barayev may have wanted to become a great Chechen hero, but the impact of his actions on Chechnya could be grim. Anti-Chechen feeling has now become a touchstone of Russian patriotism. Many Russians despise Chechens as "blacks" who lie, cheat and steal, and regard their Islamic faith with suspicion. That sentiment was almost universal among the Muscovites gathered outside the theater last week. "We must round up all these black scum and tell the terrorists we'll kill 100 of them for each dead Russian," declared a burly, bearded man whose son is fighting in Chechnya. And instead of backing off in Chechnya, Putin will probably step up military operations there, despite his claims that the Russians have already won. Critics will be marginalized, atrocities tolerated even more easily than they are now.