Huawei's headquarters in Shenzhen, a designated special economic zone that was the laboratory for China's experiments in economic liberalization.
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Huawei has made efforts to ease the concerns of foreign governments. In the U.K., it set up a special center to test its equipment for security flaws. In New Delhi, the company says, it agreed to share sensitive technology with the Indian government. But some U.S. security analysts say those measures are not enough. Telecom systems require constant updating and maintenance, in theory giving manufacturers endless opportunities to subvert networks. John Suffolk, Huawei's U.K.-based chief cybersecurity officer, says Huawei would be willing to try any new method to ensure the trustworthiness of its systems. "If they come up with a better model, it is in our interests to do that," he says. "If you don't think [the testing process] is enough, then what is?"
Even the most sophisticated testing can't assuage the fear of what Huawei might do or might be compelled to do in the future. What, ask security experts, would Ren do if asked by the PLA to use his equipment for spying or sabotage? Even Harwit, who dismisses claims that Huawei has any meaningful ties to the PLA, believes that "like any Chinese company, they are going to follow Chinese-government requests." The company dismisses such scenarios as far-fetched. "Huawei is not China," insists Sykes. "Huawei is Huawei."
With Washington plainly unconvinced by such protestations, Huawei may have no option but to limit its ambitions in the U.S. to the market for smartphones, which do not pose the same security threat. "No one cares about handsets," says James Lewis, director of the technology and public policy program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "They can sell as many as the market can take." But keeping Huawei's telecom equipment out of the U.S. won't entirely remove the risks to American communications systems. The supply chains of many electronics manufacturers stretch into China, and these complex networks of commerce are difficult to monitor. The most dangerous Trojan horses may be the ones that don't publish annual reports or employ p.r. consultants.