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The Suez crisis of 1956 was the critical juncture, when their own weakness shocked the West European powers. Britain and France invaded Egypt but then had to stand down in the face of opposition from the U.S. With the possible exception of the Falklands war, no major foreign military expedition has been launched by the European countries. They have tended to opt out of first-rank international leadership, accept their demotion to medium-size power status and grudgingly leave responsibility for their defense to the U.S. This sometimes comfortable, sometimes melancholy provincialization of Western Europe has led to a softness on terrorism and reluctance to take action.
Perhaps the strongest case for Western Europe's opposition to the U.S. retaliation is the military one. European officers, indeed even some senior NATO figures, argue that the U.S. strike was not strong enough to attain its military objectives. It neither destroyed nor destabilized the Gaddafi regime. It may, instead, have compelled moderate Arab governments to rally behind Gaddafi. Mitterrand and Chirac complained to U.S. Envoy Vernon Walters that a limited bombing raid could stir up a new wave of Islamic extremism. "With a victory like that, who needs a defeat?" said Dominique Moïsi, a French strategic expert.
Moïsi and others, however, conclude that a questionable military mission may end up having a desirable political result, and will not have lasting effects on the alliance. "Paradoxically, it has forced the Europeans to take stronger measures against Gaddafi." he says. "European passivity forced the Americans into military action, and American military action has forced the Europeans out of their passivity. The crisis should be short-lived. Neither side can afford to let it get more serious or last too long."
Despite widespread opposition to the U.S. strike, a silent minority of Europeans approved. Former French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing spoke for them when he recalled how he sent French paratroops to quell an insurgency in Zaïre in 1978. On that occasion, he noted gratefully, "our forces were conveyed from Corsica to Zaïre by American planes." Giscard and Thatcher showed that not all Europeans have forgotten how allies, even when they disagree, sometimes have to stand by each other.