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Some in Washington feel that Yurchenko was a KGB plant all along, that his defection in Rome was just a ruse. They say it is nonsense to believe that he was a real defector who decided to go back and face likely death because of a change of heart. Given his apparent access to the names and details of KGB agents in the U.S. and other nations, a former senior CIA counterintelligence official argues, a flood of arrests and expulsions would have followed his debriefings if his defection were legitimate. Instead, the skeptics point out, Yurchenko offered only meager pickings, a contention that Reagan seemed to support last week when he told reporters that Yurchenko had not provided "anything new or sensational."
Those who believe his defection was real counter by saying that Yurchenko may have been holding back information for his own reasons, parceling it out carefully as he watched how the CIA treated him. The official CIA line is that Yurchenko was in fact quite forthcoming and supplied details about the KGB network in the U.S. and abroad. As for Reagan's downplaying of Yurchenko's revelations, some espionage experts contend that it is the only sensible response for a President who wants to keep Moscow guessing how much the U.S. now knows about Soviet operations.
It is difficult to believe that the Soviets would risk using a KGB official as important as Yurchenko in a sting operation against the CIA. There is always the chance that the agent might defect for good or be forced to reveal valuable information. "If you were chief of the KGB, would you pick an agent who knew all your agents and send him on a mission like this?" asks former CIA Director Richard Helms.
Even many who support the CIA's contention that it was not hoodwinked by a fake question the agency's treatment of Yurchenko. Though the CIA in the past has kept defectors virtually imprisoned (KGB Officer Yuri Nosenko, who defected in 1964, was held in a tiny prison cell for nearly four years while U.S. intelligence officials bickered over whether he was a Soviet plant), the policy today is to give them as much freedom as possible in order to reinforce their belief in the American system. Yet sometimes that approach is sloppily executed. Yurchenko, for example, allegedly was left pretty much alone on weekends, with only one junior officer as his companion. How Yurchenko, already feeling depressed, could be allowed to eat at a restaurant within walking distance of the Soviet residential compound also mystified CIA critics. "The mishandling is obvious," says Republican Senator Frank Murkowski. "If you catch a fish this big . . . you usually check your nets to see if there are holes in them."
Many CIA officials agree that Yurchenko's handlers failed to establish a strong bond with their client. Though few believe Yurchenko took away any U.S. secrets other than a firsthand account of how the CIA conducts debriefings, the episode is still deeply embarrassing to Casey, who acted as the defector's top case officer and wrote personal memos about him to Reagan. Though the CIA plans to complete an internal inquiry about what went wrong in about six weeks, there are no White House plans for a separate investigation. Casey, however, is certain to face tough grilling on the Hill, where the Senate Intelligence Committee plans to hold hearings.