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The rebels claim to be faring better now than in the early period of the insurgency, when they were funded, trained and advised by Central Intelligence Agency operatives. "We never got explosives, for instance," says Bermúdez, "because the CIA did not want us to blow up strategic targets in Nicaragua. Now we are free to select our own targets." The attack on the bridges near Esteli last week may be the beginning of what Bermúdez describes as a campaign to cause a "real crisis" for the Sandinistas by striking against highways and power lines.
Bermúdez seems fatalistic about any ill will such raids might breed among a population already suffering from shortages of food and consumer goods, the result, among other things, of Sandinista economic and planning policies. "We have learned the hard way that good guys do not win wars," he says.
What the FDN does miss about its old CIA connection is air support. The rebel air force consists of five World War II--vintage transports that Bermúdez says "belong in a museum." The planes fly frequent supply-drop missions for units operating inside Nicaragua; during the last week of July, rebel leaders say, the aircraft ferried 35 tons of ammunition and food to the 5,500 contras said to be roaming the central mountain areas.
Bermúdez and his colleagues worry far less about manpower. They claim that 75% to 80% of the peasant population, increasingly discontent with Sandinista rule, is on the insurgents' side. Such sweeping generalizations are almost impossible to prove, but growing discontent does give the contras many advantages they did not have a year ago. About 5% of new contra recruits are women; the ages of volunteers range roughly from 17 to 35.
While the recruits are primarily campesinos, the leaders of the rebels' regional commands and task forces remain a mixed group. Of 74 commanders, 20, including Bermudez, a former colonel, served in the late dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle's hated national guard; 36 others are deserters from the Sandinista cause. Most keep their real identities secret, operating only under code names. Commander Quiche, 26, who served as a sergeant in the Somoza national guard, is now considered one of the rebels' top field officers and heads their largest command, a force of 5,500. Quiche's family does not know of his current occupation. The last time he saw his father and brothers, he says, "they told me a long story of a comandante operating in their area, and they asked me to join him. The only trouble I had was that they were talking about my own forces."
Contra leaders speak optimistically of changing the "military situation" within the next year. "We will push for the Pacific coastline and confront the Sandinista regime with a major military, economic and political crisis," says Bermudez. "If we fail, it will prolong the war and will turn it into a war of attrition." But that may not be something the contras can afford. "We cannot keep a force of this size forever," says FDN Spokesman Frank Arana. In his view, it could be now or never for the contras. --By Jill Smolowe. Reported by David Halevy with the contras