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Shultz and Shevardnadze developed an easy dialogue, something that immediately set the new Foreign Minister apart from the dour Gromyko. Said one U.S. participant: "He wasn't an automaton or a robot who just read what the Central Committee wrote for him. He was very expressive." In contrast to Gromyko, whose fabled memory for exact wording sometimes reminded his adversaries of a tape recorder, Shevardnadze occasionally improvised on standard Soviet positions. Said one U.S. official: "Even though he's just started on the job, he's already got a very good grasp of things. He was a good, strong interlocutor." Shultz found Shevardnadze's "distinct" personality "interesting and strong." Said the Secretary: "From all indications, we should have an easy ability to talk to each other in a direct and useful way."
Shevardnadze's style also drew favorable comment from other delegations. Said Canadian External Affairs Minister Joe Clark: "He's a very lively man, and he has a sense of humor. He is tough, able and flexible." Observed a West European colleague: "Despite his inexperience, he showed a natural tendency for diplomacy." Several delegates contrasted Shevardnadze's patient, inquisitive manner with the frequently hectoring and emotionless style of Gromyko. Said another conferee: "Imagine! A Soviet Foreign Minister who listens to you!"
West European delegates also noted that in their contacts with Shevardnadze, as one of them put it, "there was a tremendous emphasis on improving relations with Western Europe. It was as if he had come to Helsinki determined to play the European card." That was taken by some participants as confirmation that Gorbachev, who will pay a state visit to French President François Mitterrand before the summit with Reagan, wants to transform the strong Washington orientation of Soviet foreign policy under Gromyko into something more diversified.
President Reagan will get a chance to judge Shevardnadze's effectiveness for himself when he receives the Soviet Foreign Minister at the White House in the fall. There were signs, however, that Reagan might have to rise to additional challenges from the public-relations-conscious new leadership in Moscow well before then.
The Kremlin presumably intends to use its moratorium offer as an extended exercise in arms-control propaganda. The day after the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting, Soviet officials held a press conference in Moscow to praise the Gorbachev proposal and criticize the White House invitation to the Soviets to monitor continuing U.S. tests. Almost as an afterthought, the officials revealed that Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the Communist Party, had also been named chairman of the powerful Defense Council, which has supreme control over the country's armed forces in the event of war.
