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In the streets of Baghdad, many point the finger at al-Qaeda--and one Iraqi security source claims that there are 300 al-Qaeda sympathizers in Iraq, some of them graduates of three terrorist training camps, near Kirkuk, Karbala and Rawa. Only al-Qaeda members, says Karim al-Sabti, an art-gallery owner in Baghdad, "are heartless enough to target civilian targets. The Fedayeen Saddam or Baathists--you expect them to hit Americans." Certainly, al-Qaeda has threatened the U.N. before. In a November 2001 message, Osama bin Laden said, "The United Nations is nothing but a tool of crime" that "continues to sit idly by" while Muslims are "massacred." But secular Iraqis loyal to Saddam have also long hated the U.N. for imposing sanctions on their nation, and an Iraqi intelligence official says the mukhabarat, Saddam's security service, once studied how to hit U.N. targets in Kurdistan.
With such a plethora of possible adversaries, pity the task of U.S. military planners charged with ensuring that Iraq becomes more secure. In an interview with TIME, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld dismissed the idea that the solution is simply to send in more U.S. troops. Army General John Abizaid, head of the U.S. Central Command, says Rumsfeld, has "said repeatedly that he feels he has about the right number of U.S. forces." But both Rumsfeld and Abizaid want more Iraqis in uniform as well as more military contributions from other nations. "You want to put a bigger Iraqi face on it," says Rumsfeld, "and a bigger international face on it."
That's easier said than done. The Iraqi army was demobilized on the recommendation of U.S. proconsul Paul Bremer in May. Even Administration officials now agree, in hindsight, that the decision was a mistake, one that alienated a professional, secular organization and at the same time dispersed weapons all over Iraq. Retired General Anthony Zinni, a predecessor of Abizaid's at Centcom, agrees with that view. "The Iraqi military should have been decapitated, but its soldiers should have been kept in uniform and working with us. I'd get more Iraqis onto the street as soon as possible." That's a worthwhile goal, but it would be easier to put an Iraqi face on the occupation if the Governing Council--the 25-strong body of notables appointed by the U.S.--was more prepared to take a lead. So far, it has been a disappointment, hampered by divisions and unwilling to seek and take responsibility. "The problem," says a senior State Department official, "is that for 30 years these people have not exerted authority. They're not used to doing that."