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This raises the most interesting question about how this President uses people, both in public and in private. It's a media cliche to tell the story of an impressionable and inexperienced princeling caught between his powerful counselors: Powell and the multilateralist moderates arrayed against Rumsfeld, Cheney and the unilateralist hawks. The decision to force a confrontation with Saddam was seen as Cheney's handiwork. But the decision to first present the case to the American people, the Congress and the U.N. was taken as a victory for Powell. And the process of getting there looked awfully messy and improvised.
But a careful look finds evidence of consistent calculation at work. Both Bush and Cheney had long agreed that U.S. foreign policy had gotten flabby over the years. A clear and aggressive posture, on the other hand, could act as a deterrent to mischiefmakers and compel countries to bend to U.S. pressure. How do you behave enough like a thug to convince your enemies you are serious, but enough like a statesman to bring the allies onboard? Here is where Bush was able to use Cheney and his other lieutenants to accomplish jointly what he could not manage alone. During the summer of corporate scandal, when Bush needed to resuscitate the drooping economy, the argument over Iraq seemed to slip out of his control. Democrats sensed Bush might finally be vulnerable on a national security issue; hunting down al-Qaeda was one thing, but stirring up the entire Middle East was another. By August even some of Cheney's old colleagues from the first Bush Administration, like James Baker and Brent Scowcroft, were challenging the idea of going after Saddam so aggressively and all alone.
It was time for someone to reset the argument, but Bush couldn't do it and still keep his options open. Rumsfeld and his deputy Paul Wolfowitz couldn't make the case against Saddam because they were considered diehard hawks. But Cheney would be listened to because he spoke out so rarely. He was already scheduled to give a speech in Nashville, Tenn., to the Veterans of Foreign Wars. Speaking privately by phone with Cheney on Aug. 26, the day of the speech, Bush discussed what it would do and made some suggestions. Cheney should make it clear that the President would consult Congress and was not hell-bent on going to war. But the speech would be tough. Other war councilors heard a general outline in a conference call the day of the speech, but few knew that Bush and Cheney had gone over its fine points. "They had a long, private conversation before they had the shorter, more public one," says a White House aide.
In the speech, the longest of his vice presidency, Cheney cataloged Saddam's crimes and threats, committed the U.S. to addressing them and unapologetically declared that we would do it alone if we had to. As for giving the U.N. weapons inspectors one more chance, Cheney blew right past skepticism to scorn. The implication was that a U.S. invasion of Iraq was inevitable and imminent.