Quotes of the Day

The nuclear intentions of Iran and North Korea have been a major source of global angst for more than a year, and the Bush Administration is set to keep the pressure on both countries. Stopping in Seoul last week during a swing through Asia to revive talks on the North Korean nuclear crisis, Secretary of State Colin Powell said the world badly needed to get Pyongyang back to the negotiating table. North Korea "is a danger to every one of its neighbors," he said.

Powell expressed far less concern about recent revelations that South Korea, a U.S. ally, has been secretly tinkering with the ingredients for atomic weapons. The South Korean government in September admitted it had failed to tell the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) about its experiments with bomb-usable materials including plutonium, sparking an investigation by the agency into possible violations of Seoul's nonproliferation commitments. Although the IAEA is not due to report its findings until Nov. 25, Powell, in an interview on Korean television, said the case was as good as closed. "I'm quite sure that the IAEA will see it as a minor problem with experimentation," he said, "and not anything for the international community to be worried about."

Compared with its northern neighbor, South Korea certainly poses no threat to peace on the Korean Peninsula. But that doesn't mean the country is innocent of breaking its nuclear promises. Seoul signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in 1975, agreeing not to pursue bomb-making technology and to submit to IAEA monitoring so that techniques and materials used in nuclear-power plants are not converted to military use.

Seoul insists its scientists were not conducting weapons research and that it has fully disclosed its activities. But there is nagging evidence that the country has for decades periodically carried out clandestine experiments to gain know-how that would allow it to quickly develop atomic weapons, specifically through the production of plutonium and enrichment of uranium. (Much of the controversy surrounding Iran's nuclear program concerns efforts to enrich uranium.) Although those radioactive elements can be found in peaceful nuclear programs (with 19 reactors supplying 40% of its electricity, South Korea relies heavily on nuclear power), Seoul agreed not to produce either enriched uranium or plutonium without notifying the IAEA because the materials are essential to atom bombs. Now, the IAEA is trying to determine the truth. Among the incidents being investigated:

• A 1982 experiment in which a minute quantity of plutonium was separated from uranium. IAEA inspectors first became suspicious in 1997 when a swab at a research reactor near Seoul picked up traces of plutonium that shouldn't have been there. For years, Seoul offered no explanation, saying the paperwork had been lost. Finally, in September, the president of the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), Chang In Soon, said the traces were residual material from a "one-off test" in which fuel was taken from a reactor and dissolved in chemicals, allowing the plutonium it contained to be extracted. A confidential Ministry of Science and Technology report obtained by TIME states that five fuel rods were involved and that testing took place over two months. More ominously, the test material was "depleted" uranium imported from the former West Germany in 1976. That was a red flag for the IAEA, because depleted uranium is no good for power-plant fuel and creates more plutonium when it decays than does ordinary uranium. When the agency found out, "it really got people bent out of shape," says Mark Hibbs, Asia and Europe editor at industry publication Nucleonics Week. "That made them very keen to explore more about it."

• The IAEA is also investigating an experiment carried out in 2000 at a sophisticated lab on KAERI's sprawling campus south of Seoul. Earlier this year, after South Korea ratified a new protocol giving the IAEA broader inspection powers, Seoul told the agency that scientists at the institute had used lasers to enrich uranium. Uranium used in fuel rods is lightly enriched, usually less than 5%. During the 2000 experiment, however, researchers produced uranium that was 77% enriched, or nearly weapons grade. Seoul characterized the laser experiment as independent research carried out by curious scientists who then neglected to report it. But TIME has been told by two sources that one of the scientists involved in the 2000 experiment was Lee Jong Min, a vice president at KAERI at the time and one of the country's top laser experts. Lee's office did not respond to requests by TIME for comment.

Standing beside Powell last week, Foreign Minister Ban Ki Moon insisted his government had nothing to hide. "We're handling this in a transparent manner," he said. Officials and lawmakers in Seoul are seething over the international scrutiny, saying their country is the victim of a double standard because their ancient rival Japan is allowed to enrich uranium and separate plutonium to run reactors. "Every nation that pursues the full use of nuclear technology inevitably gets close to weapons technology," says Kim Tae Woo, a nuclear analyst at the government-run Korea Institute for Defense Analyses. "So what is wrong with that?"

The answer is easy. If a U.S. ally is allowed to get away with nuclear transgressions, there's every chance that Tehran and Pyongyang will scream bloody murder—and be less inclined to scale back their own plans. Seoul's murky nuclear history didn't seem to disturb Powell. That's a judgment he may yet come to regret.

• Donald Macintyre | Seoul
• Whatever the history of South Korea's nuclear experiments, it doesn't bother the U.S. Why not?