Quotes of the Day

The call has never been so loud or urgent: Tony Blair, a growing number of Britons say, must take a giant step away from George W. Bush before it is too late. It was bad enough that the case for war crumbled with the failure to find weapons of mass destruction and the increasing hostility of many Iraqis toward their occupiers. But with the revelations of torture and humiliation by American soldiers at Abu Ghraib prison — and their unhappy echo in tales of abuse by some British soldiers — Britain's self-respect and image in the world is on the line as never before.

Or so the argument goes. But the Prime Minister insists he will "remain shoulder to shoulder" with Bush. In a newspaper interview last week, he dismissed "this idea that at the time of maximum difficulty you start messing around your main ally." And Blair is right, because his main responsibility must be to get the best possible outcome for Iraq.

The charge that Blair has supported the Americans in a bad war without "getting" anything in return is misconceived. Blair did not go to war to meet an American loyalty test — he was a willing and even enthusiastic participant. He had long been convinced of the need to deal with Saddam Hussein, and was quite sure that Iraq was reconstituting its chemical and biological weapons programs. During the Clinton years, he was if anything frustrated with the Americans for not being energetic enough when taking on international rogues.

Nor is it the case that President Bush ignores his views. The prewar diplomacy was designed jointly between Britain and the State Department over the objections of the Pentagon. At first taking the issue to the U.N. seemed a great success, but Blair was undercut by American impatience and French obduracy. Similarly, Blair gained Bush's endorsement for the road map that would supposedly revive the Israel-Palestine peace process, but a combination of suicide bombers, Israeli intransigence and American caution means that there is nothing to show for the effort. This is the junior partner's dilemma. Not only the big decisions but the implementation depends on the main partner. Blair has been let down by the Bush Administration's half-heartedness in pursuing policies with which it has no natural sympathy, but most disastrously by its approach in Iraq. The relative British success in southern Iraq (and it is only relative) can be explained by having to contend with fewer aggrieved Baathists, and also because the British have sought to win over the local population through good works and a light touch. The American military has not found this manly enough. After underestimating the problems caused by a collapsing state and spreading lawlessness, the Americans overestimated the extent to which a tough approach would cow Iraqis. Even before Abu Ghraib, the battle for hearts and minds had probably been lost.

All this has severely weakened Blair. Some would say it is already too late for him to step away from Bush. But he still believes that the position in Iraq is retrievable, that to break with Bush would embolden the enemies of the West. And he is probably correct that neither his reputation nor his effectiveness would benefit if he issued public demands to an ally that really does listen to his private entreaties — and sometimes acts on them. With the cumulative failures of American strategy, British influence over the conduct of the occupation has grown. In April, as U.S. forces seemed determined to go with guns blazing after every faction that challenged them, the tactic threatened to create a backlash that would engulf British troops. In conversations with Bush, Blair urged calm, according to government sources who argue he can take some credit for the April 30 pullback from Fallujah.

For both Blair and Bush, much now depends on being able to hand over to an Iraqi authority at the end of June. If that can be achieved Blair will be able to claim some final vindication; but if Iraq descends into a civil war with British troops caught in the middle, it will be the end of his premiership. Either way, Iraq has now replaced Suez as the shorthand in Britain for a foreign-policy disaster. During the 1956 Suez crisis, the Americans hauled the British back from a foolhardy military adventure in the Middle East; in 2003 the Americans led the British into one. After Suez, successive British governments accepted that their international influence depended on working closely with the Americans; after Iraq they may conclude that, at least under the current management, the Americans have become a liability.

• LAWRENCE FREEDMAN
• Should Blair abandon Bush? No, says Lawrence Freedman