Quotes of the Day
Saddam Hussein may not be dead, but it’s hard for Iraqis to fear his wrath when he appears on TV looking like some bedraggled apparition of Karl Marx, being checked for head lice by a latex-gloved U.S. military medic. The psychological impact on Iraqis of the former dictator’s capture will be immense, lifting, as U.S. administrator Paul Bremer put it, a cloud that has been hanging over Iraq ever since Saddam’s regime fell on April 9. It is also a huge morale boost to the U.S.-led coalition and those Iraqis who are working with them — his continued freedom had mocked the power of the occupying forces in the eyes of ordinary Iraqis. The latest news goes way beyond what toppling a statue can achieve in signaling the irreversibility of regime-change in Baghdad. That is also the best imaginable Christmas gift for a Bush administration looking to reassure its electorate that a happy ending is in sight.
The most immediate question inside Iraq, however, is how Saddam’s capture will effect the ongoing insurgency that has killed more than 200 U.S. troops and wounded thousands since President Bush’s “mission accomplished” appearance on the U.S.S. Lincoln on May 1. Saddam’s capture is certainly a body blow those among the insurgents who hoped to restore Saddam to power — but that is not necessarily a goal that has been common to all of them. The insurgency could suffer some even more immediate knocks if Saddam cooperates with his captors, to whom he could provide an intelligence bonanza on the structure and funding of the parts of the insurgency orchestrated by his subordinates. He may also help settle the questions of what became of his alleged weapons of mass destruction.
|
|
||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||
Saddam’s capture, in short, opens a new chapter in the history of Iraq, and its relations with the United States. But it remains a complicated and sharply contentious chapter, even if removing Saddam himself as a factor allows all the contending forces to redefine themselves and their objectives.
Saddam, of course is not dead — the immediate future might be a lot easier for the coalition, for his would-be inheritors on the Iraqi Governing Council, and even, perhaps, for anti-American insurgents if he were. Instead, the U.S. and its Iraqi allies have to contend with the question of what to do with Saddam the prisoner: Whether to try him in Iraq or abroad; how to extract essential information from a doomed man without offering him a deal, and so on. Even more important is the question of whether his capture, together with the earlier elimination of his sons, will help draw Saddam’s Baathist supporters into a new, peaceful political process. Bremer reached out to them in Sunday's press conference: “With the arrest of Saddam Hussein, there is a new opportunity for the members of the former regime, whether military or civilian, to end their bitter opposition."
The coalition may be hoping that by removing Saddam’s shadow over the process, more former Baathists may be brought into the political process. But it remains unlikely for now that his capture will end the insurgency. Many of the insurgents and their commanders are remnants of the old regime. But the organizing principle of the campaign has been less about restoring Saddam than about ejecting the Americans, and on that basis it has drawn support and participation from elements of the Sunni community previously hostile to the dictatorship. As much as he may have been a rallying point for some supporters of the insurgency, for others who prefer to cast it as a broader nationalist and Islamist response to occupation, he was an albatross. The circumstances of his capture almost alone in a grimy bolt-hole outside his home town certainly appears to suggest that for those waging daily attacks on U.S. forces from Mosul in the north to Najaf in the south, protecting Saddam Hussein may not have been the first operational priority. His capture also raises a dilemma for those insurgents looking to broaden the appeal of their rebellion — Saddam may have been more use to them as a symbol of the past, rather than as a captive of the enemy. The extent to which the insurgency appears to be about Saddam himself may set limits on its growth: Many Iraqis oppose the occupation, but very few want Saddam back in power.
The insurgents will almost certainly fight on, and even intensify their activities in the hope of showing that Saddam’s capture has not weakened them. But now that he’s a prisoner rather than a corpse, they too will face a challenge of defining their relationship to him. A “Free Saddam” movement would certainly be a tougher sell among ordinary Iraqis than a “Yankee Go Home” one.
What is in play now is the question of political power in Baghdad, and who will wield it. And that promises to be a process even more complex and potentially violent than the past seven months in Iraq has been. Even with Saddam in the can, there’s unlikely to be any acceleration, just yet, in plans to bring U.S. forces home.
- Tony Karon
- With Saddam in captivity, all sides face strategic challenges