Quotes of the Day

The Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports that there is no "evidence" of such a program, though Iran is developing relevant technology and has shown a "pattern of concealment" over the past 18 years. At a meeting November 20 of the IAEA, the organization's 35-member board of governors will decide whether to declare Iran in noncompliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and refer it to the U.N. for possible action, as the U.S. wants, or reprimand but continue to work with it, as the U.K., France and Germany prefer. TIME's Andrew Purvis spoke to IAEA head Mohamed ElBaradei at his home in Vienna.

Iran's nuclear program doesn't look like a typical civilian power project. Does anybody believe it is exclusively for peaceful purposes? It's not a question of belief or disbelief. Iran is saying it is willing to come clean and they are ready to demonstrate that. We got answers to all our questions. We got access to the facilities. We are getting robust inspections. But this is a work in progress. We are not finished.

And yet your report notes a pattern of concealment dating back 18 years. Their program was developed under international sanctions. Many of their activities have to be understood in that context.

U.S. Under Secretary of State John Bolton called your report's finding of no evidence of a weapons program "impossible to believe." We are not in the business of judging intentions. What we look for are facts and proof, and so far we have no proof of a nuclear-weapons program. The jury is still out.

Still, the U.S. Insists it is a weapons program. Does Washington know something that you don't? I would think that is speculation. But if they have information that would point to a weapons program, obviously they have an obligation to share it with us.

Have you seen a change in attitude in your meetings with the Iranians? There is clearly a change in policy. In my meeting last week with [head of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, Hassan] Rohani, he made it very clear that there was a new chapter, an attempt to convince the world that they are clean.

Tehran has explained the discovery of weapons-grade uranium traces this year as the result of contaminated equipment. Is that true? We are closer [to an answer]. We now know where the components, which Iran says were contaminated, came from. Our next priority is to go to the countries where they came from and talk to them about what they know. There are five, in Europe and Asia.

Should Iran be referred to the U.N. Security Council? That is for member states to decide. it is being hotly debated. But the Security Council's basic function is to ensure compliance with the [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty] and right now we are seeing compliance by Iran. So the question is: do we need to report to the Council? If [government representatives] decide against going to the Council, it should not be looked at as a reward.

Are sanctions an option? I don't think that anybody at this stage is talking about sanctions. But clearly member states are concerned that Iran stay the course and work closely with us.

Even if Iran plays ball for now, it may still in a few years be able to pull out of its treaty obligations and make a bomb within months, right? That is why we need to strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Thirty years ago, not many countries could master the technology to go nuclear. Now 30 or 40 can, if they get the components and equipment. The best way to deal with bad intentions is to control capability.

Do we need the U.N. to do that? Unless you are ready to bomb your way through every country you suspect of developing weapons of mass destruction, I see no alternative to international inspectors. The lesson of Iraq is that we should be very cautious about jumping to conclusions.

What other tools do you need? I don't believe we should allow national control over the sensitive part of the [nuclear] fuel cycle. We need to 'multilaterize' the enrichment of uranium. We also need more countries to sign the additional protocol [allowing tougher inspections]. And we need to address why countries see the nuclear option as so attractive. That is the most difficult. North Korea [for example] is absolutely craving security assurance. This sense of insecurity is what we need to work on, whether the threat is from dictatorships or democracies.

The U.S. Congress has appropriated money to begin research into so called "mini nukes". What impact will that have? It sends a powerfully wrong message. You cannot say that nuclear weapons should not spread to new countries and at the same time try to embark on research into 'useable' nuclear weapons, (which) by the way would have half the yield of the Hiroshima bomb.

The U.S. says you no longer have a role in Iraq. What is your view? We could close the nuclear file faster than the U.S. team, and for less money. We have the experience. We know where to go. We know the scientists. And we have credibility. In March, we said that we needed a few months to finish the job. Had there not been a war, we would be done.

• ElBaradei talks to TIME about Iran's nuke "threat"