In October 1994, the U.S. and North Korea concluded a tense, two-year standoff with an accord that seemed to usher in a new era of cooperation in North Asia. By signing a deal called the Agreed Framework, the U.S. promised to provide impoverished North Korea with energy assistance. In exchange, the North agreed to halt production of plutonium that could be used to make nuclear weapons. Countries in the Stalinist state's menacing nuclear shadow breathed easier as then President Bill Clinton congratulated his envoys for coaxing the backward dictatorship toward joining the global community. On the day the agreement was signed, Clinton assured the world that the deal was "the first step on the road to a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula."
In the nine years that have passed, it's become painfully obvious that Clinton's road to peace was a dead end. Instead of embracing the outside world and abandoning its nuclear-development program in 1994, North Korea today is more isolated, armed and dangerous than ever before—and once again, the U.S. is preparing to horse-trade with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il in hopes of convincing him to back away from the nuclear brink. This time, America won't be alone: upcoming negotiations, to be held in Beijing on August 27-29, will include representatives from China, Japan, Russia and South Korea, all there to help with the arm twisting. And publicly, the Administration of President George W. Bush is upbeat about prospects for headway during the multilateral negotiations. "I'd like to solve this diplomatically, and I believe we can," Bush said after the talks were announced.
Given the burgeoning costs and complexities involved in the U.S. effort to rebuild Iraq after taking out Saddam Hussein, the fact that "regime change" is being discussed at all is evidence of rising exasperation with Kim. In the past year, the Dear Leader has repudiated all past nuclear bargains and treaties, including the Agreed Framework and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, all the while hurling provocative invective at the U.S. Kim's government acknowledges it has been carrying out a clandestine program to make bombs from enriched uranium. North Korea is believed to have enough fissile material for at least two N-bombs already, and since abrogating the Agreed Framework, Pyongyang officials claim to have extracted enough plutonium from spent nuclear-reactor fuel rods to make five or six more bombs.
|
|||||||||
In early August, Taiwan impounded a North Korean vessel at the request of the U.S., confiscating 158 barrels of a chemical that U.S. officials said could be an ingredient for weapons of mass destruction. "More of its boats will be stopped," says a Western official involved in interdiction policy. "This is the future for North Korea." Even China, North Korea's only real benefactor and the host for this week's talks, is losing patience and has admonished North Korea to disarm.
Indeed, to the outside world it would seem in Kim's best interest to move swiftly to settlement. "North Korean leaders realize their economy is very sick, and they don't want it to die," says a Western diplomat in Seoul. Though Kim would not immediately get from the U.S. his full wish list—a security guarantee, diplomatic ties and an end to economic sanctions—aid would flow if he opened his nuclear programs to the invasive inspections that the U.S. and its allies demand.
Still, in the past when Kim has emerged from his hardened bunker, he has proven to be a maddeningly immovable negotiator. Talks leading to the 1994 Agreed Framework took 55 rounds to complete; current talks have not begun, yet already the North has set the process back by threatening to export nuclear bombs. "These are people who believe in letting 20% of their people starve if necessary," says Adrian Buzo, an Australian scholar who was a diplomat in Pyongyang in the 1970s. "They already have missiles. They have rudimentary nuclear devices. What can the world offer them?"
South Korean Foreign Minister Yoon Young Kwan has said he is expecting "a long process for settlement, rather than being too optimistic or pessimistic about the outcomes of the first round of talks." Because of the antipathy between Washington and Pyongyang, negotiations could last years. But some believe they might be over before they even begin. "I worry the Americans are only negotiating to show they tried diplomacy but wouldn't mind seeing the talks break down," says Zhang Tuosheng, director of research at the Foundation for International Strategic Studies in Beijing. Ultimately, Zhang fears, the Bush Administration wants to topple Kim. So what happens if Kim continues to stall and cheat? "At the end of that road lies the fate of Saddam Hussein," says a Western diplomat in Seoul. That's a far different path than the peaceful byway envisioned by Clinton nine years ago.