Quotes of the Day

For a man who plausibly holds decisions on war and peace in his hands, Hans Blix gives the impression of being a remarkably relaxed fellow. Sitting in his office at the United Nations building in New York City, with satellite photos of Baghdad on the walls, the Swedish diplomat who heads the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) has a comfortable, lived-in look about him; he's the kind of man who in the movie might have been played by Alec Guinness in his prime. He has a caution that comes from decades as an official in international institutions but exudes a wry affability; asked if he would be comfortable with a certain course of action, he replies: "I'm not uncomfortable with it." Pause, followed by smile. Then: "As a diplomat, I can't say I'm comfortable."

Blix—one of those rumpled lawyers who always see both sides of a question—could hardly be more different from George W. Bush, a man of clenched jaw and moral clarity. Yet the Swede's words now have the sort of power that some Bush Administration officials would otherwise ascribe only to Holy Writ. If Blix says that his inspectors are making progress on disarming Iraq, then the U.S. probably will not soon win broad international backing for a war. If, on the other hand, Blix concludes that Iraq has had no intention of cooperating with the inspectors, then the U.S. might yet win support for the use of force from the U.N. Security Council and from nations like France and Russia that have so far opposed a war.

Blix insists that all he does is "give an accurate description of the reality that I see." The decision on whether Iraq is in material breach of Security Council resolutions, he says, is a matter for the Council itself. But after an hour-long interview with Blix late last week, a group of Time editors came away with the impression that he was a lot more skeptical of Iraqi behavior than has been assumed and that he could imagine Saddam Hussein exhausting the patience even of those countries that presently want to give the inspectors more time.

The Iraqis, Blix said, "have no credibility." He found it "a bit odd" that Baghdad, with "one of the best organized regimes in the Arab world," should claim to have no records of the alleged destruction of its stocks of anthrax and VX nerve agent. He was prepared to contemplate a timeline and ultimatum for the destruction of key weapons and their building blocks, saying that the Iraqis "cannot drag it on forever." He argued that American military might had been instrumental in what recent progress there has been on Iraqi disarmament. "I don't think there would have been any inspection but for outside pressure, including U.S. forces," Blix said. He reminded his listeners that neither France nor the European Union as a whole had ruled out the use of military action to compel disarmament. And when questioned as to whether he would ask the Iraqis to dismantle or destroy their al-Samoud missiles, whose range, his experts had determined, breached permissible limits, Blix replied, "Of course." The next day, in a detailed letter, he instructed Baghdad to start the process of destroying those missiles—together with ancillary equipment and related software—by March 1.

The letter, and Blix's comments to TIME, represent a new twist in a story that has got more of them than a chignon. In late January, Blix reported to the U.N., in essence, that the Iraqis were not serious about complying with Council resolutions on disarmament. Secretary of State Colin Powell and his team expected that a second report from Blix would confirm that appraisal and were looking forward—as one U.S. official put it—to the French "coming to the head of the parade." Those hopes were massacred on St. Valentine's Day, when Blix's report seemed to stress a new degree of cooperation from Iraq, and the French, far from falling into line, rallied wavering members of the Council in opposition to the American view. State Department officials don't try to hide their dismay. "It was a rough day," said one, "a solid body blow."

If Blix is now making another turn, it wouldn't surprise some of his observers. He's a "a political barometer," says a former weapons inspector. One diplomat at the U.N. thinks that the UNMOVIC boss was surprised by the extent to which the February report was considered soft on Iraq. Blix, says this official, wishes he had included in the second paper some of his earlier criticisms of Baghdad. Such tough language may yet resurface. Blix is scheduled to make a regular, quarterly report on UNMOVIC's work on March 1; the paper will probably be considered by the Security Council the following week.

And at any time, Blix may give—and Council members may request—updates on the extent to which Iraq is complying with the terms of Council Resolution 1441, adopted unanimously last November. The Bush Administration, however, cannot assume that Blix will make its case for it. A new report might not be so critical of Iraq that all members of the Security Council immediately agree that inspections must end and military action begin. Nevertheless, the Administration, having earlier wavered on whether to even pursue a new resolution for action, has now decided to take a gamble on it. The U.S. and its British ally intend to introduce wording that restates the terms of 1441, that notes that Iraq has failed to take its last chance to disarm and that recalls the Council promise that "serious consequences"—meaning war—would follow if Iraq did not.

Neither the U.S. nor Britain wants the resolution to specify actions that Iraq must take to demonstrate compliance, as Germany once suggested. Saddam Hussein, the Administration thinks, knows how to play that game too well. "You give 'em a benchmark," said one senior Administration official last week, "and they do 30% of it and say 'Well, we're working on it.'" Indeed, for that reason, American officials were wary of Blix's tough letter on the al-Samouds. "This is a double-edged missile," said one, mangling his metaphors. "We expect Iraq to engage in a very showy destruction of one or two or three missiles while leaving most of them intact. The American position is that destruction must be done fully and completely and immediately."

A second resolution offers a number of benefits to the Administration. First, it plays to the concerns of the American public: in a new TIME/CNN poll, 61% of Americans either oppose a war in Iraq on any terms, or would support one only if it had U.N. backing. In the Arab world, diplomats believe a U.N. mandate for military action is essential if a war is not to be seen as a crude display of American power. Keeping the issue of Iraq under the U.N. umbrella, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal told Time recently, "would remove the idea that there are ulterior motives for whatever actions that are being taken against Iraq, as an effort to put Iraq under the thumb of imperialism."

A second resolution is no less important for Bush's principal ally. Failure to secure one before war is undertaken could prove a political disaster for British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who has faced big demonstrations for peace and has promised the electorate that guns will not be fired without an attempt to win a further U.N. sanction. Blair, says a U.S. official, wants a second resolution "in the worst way. It's probably indispensable to him." If that's what Blair wants, that's what he will get. Bush himself backs Blair to the hilt. "You're a great leader," the President told the Prime Minister last week. "The courage you've shown is admirable." So despite the grumbling from some hard-liners in Washington who think a new resolution will slow down the march to war, the search for nine votes—the number needed to pass a resolution in the 15-member Security Council—is on.

Unless the Iraqis shoot themselves in the foot, however, support won't be easy to find. "Nine votes are not doable right now," said one Administration official last week. Even if the U.S. finds the votes, France or Russia could exercise a veto, though the U.S. is hoping they would abstain instead.

If a new resolution proves unattainable, how difficult would it be for the U.S. to turf out Saddam and rebuild Iraq without U.N. support? In terms of actually fighting a war, there shouldn't be a problem. American soldiers (some of them, at least) tend to dismiss those of other nations. "They get in the way, can't speak English too well—except for the Brits—and their weapons can't keep up with ours," says one Army officer. Indeed, with or without a U.N. vote, Pentagon plans for a war assume that only the British—who will provide about 45,000, or close to 20% of the total force—and Australians would have a substantial role in the fighting. Other nations, in a "coalition of the willing," may supply logistics assistance and units to detect biological and chemical weapons. Yet even if the Pentagon may not need or even want much foreign help, U.S. armed forces do require other kinds of cooperation, like basing and overflight rights. This was most recently demonstrated in the long- running argument between the U.S. and Turkey over the price—literally—of allowing U.S. troops on Turkish soil. While the diplomats haggled, nearly three dozen ships started to ferry men and equipment of the 4th Infantry Division from the U.S. to Turkey. Under the war plans, the division is supposed to attack Iraq from the north. Diverting the Turkey-bound ships to the Persian Gulf—probably to Kuwait—would delay the optimum start date of a war by a month. Both Turkish and Administration officials said at the end of last week that a broad basis for a deal had been reached.

Turkey is not the only nation that will seek financial compensation for backing a foreign power. Both Israel and Jordan are already doing the same. The Administration is helping to broker arrangements by which Jordan will be supplied with oil from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait on the same preferential terms (a 75% discount on the market price) it now receives from Iraq. Last week Dov Weisglass, director-general of the office of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, was at the White House for talks with Gary Edson, an economic and national-security aide to Bush. The Israelis, sources familiar with the negotiations tell Time, have asked for an extra $4 billion in military aid for equipment such as missile-defense and early-warning systems, plus another $8 billion in loan guarantees. "This is our idea," says one Israeli source, adding, generously, "but obviously it's not take it or leave it."

As they say in Washington: a billion here, a billion there, and pretty soon you're talking real money. Would full international backing reduce the cost of war to U.S. taxpayers? It did the last time. When the accounts were tallied at the end of the Gulf War, the U.S came as close to breaking even as any nation at war is likely to do. In the 1990s, James Baker, then the Secretary of State, flew hither and yon rattling a tin cup and looking for contributions to the cost of battle. Saudi Arabia ponied up $16.8 billion, Kuwait $16 billion. Japan, which 12 years ago thought it was about to be a superpower, gave $10.7 billion, while a grateful, newly unified Germany gave another $6.6 billion. All in all, the Pentagon eventually put a $61.1 billion price tag on the war, of which other nations paid all but $7.4 billion.

It won't be that way again. Nobody's asking for donations before the fighting starts, because nobody expects any to come in. "There's a realization," says a senior intelligence official, "that other governments would not be nearly as forthcoming this time." And the problem is, it isn't just war that costs money. After the guns fall silent, Iraq will have to be rebuilt, which—even allowing for the fact that Iraqi oil revenue will help to pay for a new infrastructure—will be expensive. Precisely how expensive, nobody knows. Officials have ducked that question before congressional committees. "It would be foolish for any of us to put a number on it," says the senior intelligence official. "The last person who tried was (former chief economic aide to the President) Larry Lindsey, and he lost his job." Lindsey had estimated the total cost of war would be $100 billion to $200 billion. In one much quoted analysis, economist William Nordhaus of Yale University has said that the cost of war and reconstruction over a decade could range from a low of $100 billion to a high of $1.9 trillion. At current prices, that would make an Iraq war second only to World War II in its financial impact on Americans.

Almost certainly, securing U.N. support for a war would reduce the cost to the U.S. of rebuilding Iraq. A senior British official says that if the U.N. backs a war, it would be fairly easy to imagine a postconflict administration in Iraq under U.N. auspices—even if the U.N. had to work with an American military proconsul. Inevitably, the U.N.'s humanitarian agencies will establish an early presence in Iraq to ameliorate short-term hardship. But the U.S., says U.N. Under Secretary-General Shashi Tharoor, has not yet asked the U.N. to prepare for a role in longer-term reconstruction. Assuming the U.N. is indeed asked to help with that task—which is the private assumption of top officials at U.N. headquarters in New York City—there is the question of who will pay for it. That in turn may depend on how the war was waged. "If the U.S. does it with only a coalition of the willing," says the British official, "the other democracies will be reluctant to cough up later."

It's hard to avoid the conclusion: in terms of American public opinion, political support in Britain and the Arab states, facilitating military action, and the cost of war and reconstruction, securing a second Security Council resolution would do the U.S. a lot of good. Will such a resolution be passed? While Bush headed off to his ranch in Texas last weekend, the answer to that question was left with a man whose language epitomizes those very shades of gray that Bush seems to hate. "I'm not rushing to conclusions," says Blix; "I have to be a lawyer ... Monitoring requires patience ... I try to get the balance that I perceive is true." Not the words that Bush would use. But don't be surprised if, one day soon, Hans Blix's modulated tones summon up the dogs of war.

—With reporting by Massimo Calabresi, John F. Dickerson and Mark Thompson/Washington, Scott MacLeod/Cairo, J.F.O. McAllister/London and Marguerite Michaels/U.N.

• Michael Elliott