Quotes of the Day

Q: I want to start by asking the political situation in Iraq — about your efforts to shepherd Iraqi politicians towards a national-unity government. There's been a lot of dissonance recently; what we're hearing from the Iraqi politicians, in the public sphere, doesn't allow for much confidence that such a government is possible. If anything, since the events of Samarra, they seem to be farther away. I want to get a sense of what you feel, what has changed since Samarra and how that has affected your efforts?

A: The basic problem of Iraq right now is ethnic and sectarian rivalry and competition. And there is a continuing effort on the part of the terrorists — in particular, the Zarkawi group — to pro-voke civil war. The attacks on Samarra pushed the country in that direction. But I think the Iraqi leaders decided not to go that way and stopped rather than move towards a civil war further. The effort by the terrorists to provoke a civil war continues. But the answer to the challenge of Iraq, given the ethnic and sectarian rivalry, is the establishment of a national-unity government. The Iraqi leaders generally have agreed to this.

The Samarra attack delayed [this effort]. The focus became crisis management and discouraging people from going towards civil war. Now the focus is back to the formation of a government.

If I could take a minute, I'd like to discuss what a national-unity government would mean. What are the forces that should constitute this government? On that, there is broad agreement —not unanimous, but broad agreement — that it should be formed from the Shi'ite alliance, the Kurdish alliance, the Sunni Arab alliance and across sectarian groups, [the secular block] led by Iyad Allawi. The second issue is that there has to be a process for decision-making in which these forces could participate and that's important for a variety of reasons. There is a strong polarization along ethnic and sectarian lines that indicates a lack of trust across these groups. If, in the Iraqi government, there is a place where decisions are being coordinated and where the representatives of these groups are all there, where there's transparency — that would help to build bridges of confidence.

And there are several areas under discussion. One is that there should be a sort of coordinating National Security Council that will bring the key four elements—the presidency, the prime minister, the deputy, the speaker, and the leader of the courts. Plus, representatives from other blocs that form the government but don't hold one of these positions. This council would coordinate policies.

The other idea is that the government ministries should be categorized into baskets — a basket of security, a basket of finance and oil, and a basket of services — and all the political blocks will be represented in each of these baskets. That doesn't mean that the political forces have to be represented equally — there was an election, and the result of the election has to reflect itself in the formation of the government — but there will have to be representation.

The third element is a common program. You don't want a government where two ministries run according to policies of Sunni Arabs, three according to the policies of the Shi'ites, and so on. So there has to be a program that allows for governing from the center.

And then lastly of course, there is the issue of people in key positions. There are, of course, good people in each of the communities and political forces. There has to be an emphasis on competence. The key institutions — such as defense, interior, intelligence and some others — have to be run by people who are broadly trusted. It is very important that the ministries are run people that are unifiers, not polarizers.

This is a package — many Iraqis agree with it, many leaders agree with it — is the right medicine if you like, for the problem that Iraqis face with this ethnic and sectarian situation.

Q: What you have just described would be difficult to achieve in almost any society. In Iraq, where, in addition to all the problems of normal multiethnic, multireligious society, you also have forces that are actively provoking division, is it even possible?

A: I think it's possible. I think it's necessary. It is required. It's clear that it's difficult, but I think it is urgent, because the country is in a crisis situation, and crises can fragment and polarize or bring people together. For the Iraqi leadership, this is the time of very, very important decisions, and I believe that working with them, we can achieve these goals. But it will take time. It takes effort, it's hard. It's hard for them because of this lack of trust.

Q: How much harder have things become since the bombing of the Shiíite shrine in Samarra? Is there less tendency for them to compromise?

A: The Samarra crisis could help push them, encourage them to go in this direction. If they didn't have a feeling that there was a concerted effort at provoking civil war by the enemies of Iraq, they cannot have any doubts in the aftermath of Samarra.

Q: I notice that the politicians seem to be back-tracking even on things that they had more or less agreed upon. For instance, this effort to unseat Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari. Before Samarra, it seemed the parties had come to the general acceptance that he was going to remain Prime Minister in the new government. Now there seems to be a strong effort to dislodge him, and that really angers the Shi'ite bloc.

A: I think that the effort to choose a prime minister that would be broadly acceptable is moving based on a constitutionally mandated process. He won the nomination of the biggest bloc, the UIA. It was 64 votes for him out of 130 and 63 for Adel Abdul Mehdi. And there was a discussion among the other elements about their response to this nomination. There were some issues with regard to the response of [Jaafari's] government immediately in the aftermath of Samarra, where some people thought that a curfew should have been imposed immediately while the government took more than a day-and-a-half to make that decision. And there is the issue of the visit to Turkey that also has been a very [upsetting for the Kurds].

But there was discussion about the prime minister that was taking place in the aftermath of the nomination. There is a peaceful, democratic process that needs to be followed, to come to an agreement that will have the support of two-thirds. I believe the government will be decided as a package—the presidency, prime minister, ministers, and so. You need to have the agreement of two-thirds of the members of the assembly and that's going forward.

Q: Does the U.S. have a preference? It has been suggested that the U.S. would prefer to see Adel Abdul Mehdi as prime minister.

A: I've said that to everyone here that it's an Iraqi decision. We're interested in this whole package: Process, program, individuals. When it comes to the individuals, whether Mehdi or Jaafari or someone else, that's up to the Iraqis. They want someone who can bring two-thirds of the Iraqis in the assembly together as cross-sectarian, cross-ethnic support. Someone who is competent, someone able to bridge the ethnic and sectarian divide.

Q: How far can you push the rationale and need for a National Unity Government? If it turns out that's not what these political groups are willing to live with, what then? Can you work with a government that excludes an ethnic or sectarian group — if that's the way the politics wind up?

A: I do not believe they will wind up that way, because of the numbers [required in the assembly to form a government]. I believe that there will be a broad-based coalition. We'll work with them for that and I think we'll get that. I do not believe that it's in Iraq's interest or that they will come to that decision to go for a solution that excludes one ethnic group or one sect. I don't think we will face a situation like that.

Q: Could there be a situation where — as in the current, interim government — there are token ministers from some communities, but the communities don't feel that they're represented?

A: Well, the reason this is the case in the interim government is that the Sunni Arabs did not participate in that election. So you had a very small Sunni Arab representation in the National Assembly and the Sunnis who were selected for some positions were not accepted by the others. One of the successes of Iraq in the past six or seven months has been to get the Sunni Arabs to participate in the political process. I think that change has been the most significant change of the past period and a very positive change and that bodes well for Iraq. Now the next step is to integrate them into the government. We'll be working hard to get the Sunnis, first of all, to participate in the political process, then to get the insurgents to cease violence and also participate in the political process and to isolate the terrorists who seek to provoke a civil war. Insurgents who want Saddamism back, and that's a small group, cannot be accommodated. Neither can the terrorists be accommodated. Everyone else can be brought into the political process.

The next big hurdle or challenge for this government is national unity and some agreement and broader support for the constitution. I believe is you have those two additional steps, Iraq will be on the right trajectory. There will be difficulties, but it will be heading in the right direction.

Q: You mentioned the alterations to the constitution. The Shi'ite leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim has made some really blunt comments that the constitution will not be changed. That's in direct opposition of the deal the Sunnis bought into last year. How serious is he? Is he bluffing? What's your take on that?

A: Well, I believe he agrees, as do others, there has to be accommodation between communities, an understanding, and with the constitution. There are several options. The constitution agreement calls for the constitution to be reviewed and for some changes proposed within four months of the establishment of a new government. If we get a national unity government, we'll begin to work together in governing the country. That will have a positive spillover effect in the negotiations over the constitution. They may reach an agreement to defer some text. They may agree to extend the life of the new period. Or they may come to some agreement as to when what might take place. One of the big concerns of the Sunni Arabs is the whole issue of federalization of the Arab Shi'ites in the south. There are lots of options there and there are bridging formulas that they are beginning to talk about — but right now is not the time to resolve that or to mix that with the government formation issue.

Q: You talked about building bridges among the political groups. One of the most noticeable changes I've seen taken place in the last few months, is how gaps are opening up in Iraqi society. In Baghda's mixed-sectarian neighborhoods, bridges that existed for hundreds of years have been broken. Neighborhoods are being divided along ethnic lines. People are leaving neighborhoods where they are the minority to go live in neighborhoods where they feel safer.

A: Yes.

Q: That is a fundamental change from the situation before. For three years Iraq has been attacked by terrorists and insurgents. What happened after Samarra for the first time, in my view, was that neighbor attacked neighbor. With provocation and with the help of militias, perhaps, but basically neighbors attacked neighbors.

A: Sure.

Q: When Shi'ite mobs came into a Sunni Arab neighborhood, they came into a mixed neighborhood, Shi'ite families pointed out, "That is a house of a Sunni." This is new and different. It points to a cleavage in society itself. That trend seems to be going in the exact opposite direction to the political direction you want the parties to take. How do you make those two line up? How do you make people come back to their neighborhoods?

A: Well, what you are pointing to — and I'm not confirming what you said that this is what happened, that neighbors pointed to another neighbor — is the ugly thing about civil war. That's precisely what happens: Neighbors fighting neighbors, and it's the worst kind of war. And this is a neighborhood where civil wars have taken place recently — look at Lebanon, Afghanistan. And in the discussions that we've had with the Iraqi leaders, we have pointed this out to them, that we see a certain trend in terms of polarization and that it needs to be reversed—contained and reversed—because if it leads to civil war, it will be the worst kind of war and everything must be done to avoid that.

In my judgment if we get the politics of this right, we get a government of national unity, and if we get sensitive ministries in the hands of people who are unifiers, who are broadly trusted, then I think you will begin to reverse this trend—contain it and to reverse it.

I see what happened in the immediate aftermath of Samarra as a strategic warning to the Iraqi society and Iraqi leadership and hopefully a wake-up call in terms of what the potential threat is, and therefore, what needs to be done.

Q: What should developments should Americans be follolwing in Iraq? How should they judge you and measure your performance?

A: I have great confidence in the American people. I think if there is a problem, it is with us not communicating well. I think the American people understand that Iraq is important, given its location, given our dependence on this region. They understand that. But I think it is even more important than that they understand that what happens in Iraq, the outcome of the struggle here, will reshape the region. And that, and the future of this region will shape the future of the world.

This is a defining challenge of our time, in a way containing the Soviet Union was the defining challenge of the previous era. I think is necessary is that the American people give us the time. I believe that we have the right approach here, it needs to have the opportunity to reveal itself in terms of shaping the facts on the ground. I think getting the Sunnis to participate, which was the focus of a lot of concerted effort, did produce results. It hasn't changed the violence as much as perhaps people had expected. I believe we have the right goal. We have the right strategy. We have worked very hard. We have taken on a very, very difficult challenge. I don't want to sugar-coat that. I know we're in a very difficult neighborhood. Unfortunately important things are often very difficult things to do, and it takes persistence, but it also takes adaptability, being agile, and adjust as required.

I'm quite strategically, quite optimistic that we are heading, we are going in the right direction, although the tactical situations are difficult and right now, we are in one of the more difficult periods, in the aftermath of Samarra, in the period of the formation of a government. I urge people in Washington to not to be nervous, but stick with the goals, be flexible, but recognize that it will be difficult.

Q: The violence since Samarra — does it call for a rethink on troop positions?

A: No. Not if we go the way I described. I believe that if we get — when we get — the National Unity Government, when we have ministries run by competent ministers, and as we get into the next phase of our Sunni outreach ... I see a set of circumstances, frankly, that would allow for a significant withdrawal of our forces.

Q: In what time frame?

A: I'm talking about within this year, additional withdrawals are possible. I remain contingently optimistic — contingent on what I just described, that we get the unity government.

Q: Are you frustrated that you don't have leverage with some of the forces who can lead the country to civil war — the insurgency and the militias — or some of the people who can prevent it, like Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani? In the absence of that leverage, how do you push people?

A: There are frustrations, clearly. I think is a real constraint, not being able to communicate with Sistani directly. That's a constraint that affects performance. As far as other leverage is concerned, I believe that we do have leverage. People want to know where the United States stands. It is because we have forces here, we spend money here, and have influence because of who we are, our standing in the world. So they do listen to us, take our views into account, but not always do what we ask for. I understand there are limitations as well. But when appropriate we do apply leverage.

Q: How do you deal with Moqtada al-Sadr?

A: Well, I don't deal with him directly. It's a challenge. He has a foot in the government. He's part of the coalition, but he also behaves and does things that are outside the framework of government policy. The other day, he spoke very negatively about U.S. forces, our presence in Basra. I responded that we are not an occupation force any more. The government that he's part of asked for us to stay.

We need to deal with him by dealing with the militia problem and I believe that we will focus sharply on the militia issue. That will be our policy and we'll encourage the next government to focus on this problem. But Moqtada al-Sadr is an issue, is a phenomenon, a challenge that has to be dealt with.

• U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, sat down last week for an interview with TIME's Aparisim Ghosh and Christopher Allbritton. This is an edited transcript;