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But in Afghanistan, Australian special forces were something of a novelty to their US commanders. On one map in the main US command center in Afghanistan, they were denoted by a cut-out picture of Australian celebrity crocodile hunter, Steve Irwin. "It was pretty disheartening, says one trooper. "The way they did use us was very inappropriate.''

From interviews with former soldiers and one of the taskforce's senior intelligence officers, Time can reveal how US commanders underestimated - and underutilized - the SAS's core ability to go deep behind enemy lines and gather key intelligence. The soldiers say US commanders lost key opportunities to take out senior al-Qaeda leaders by forcing the SAS to occupy mere "blocking" duties during one key battle. However the US perceptions were ultimately reversed after the SAS mounted an extraordinary mission to locate and coordinate an attack on one of al-Qaeda most senior leaders. The target was either Osama Bin Laden's number two, Ayman Al-Zawahari, or a senior Uzbek commander, Tor Yuldashev.

"The Americans couldn't comprehend we would have the ability to go into areas for protracted times to do our strategic roles,'' says former Afghanistan SAS taskforce intelligence chief Adam, who spoke exclusively to Time. "It's not what they do, because they think you go in for a day or two days, and do your business and get out,'' says Adam, who does not want his surname used for security reasons. "It wasn't until after certain high-tempo combat engagements during (Operation) Anaconda that we kind of worked out that we can do better than this.'' Similar distinctions were noted amongst the lower ranks. "They were body-builder types, full of steroids, some of them,'' says one SAS Afghan veteran. "They could only manage a couple of days. We could go for weeks at a time.''

Adam says the opportunities for the SAS to prove themselves were so uninspiring that the Australian contingent were packing up to leave just four months into their deployment in Afghanistan. But the U.S. forces finally appreciated their value and skills after an SAS patrol managed to scale a mountain overlooking the Shah-i-Kot "Valley of the kings" in East Afghanistan where they called in reports on a group of al-Qaeda fighters performing training exercises.

The Americans were in the planning stages of "Operation Anaconda," a mission to attack the enemy in Shah-i-Kot, says Adam, and "they didn't take kindly to our probing of that area - despite the fact it was an excellent ground recon effort.'' The Australians sought involvement in Anaconda but were given a lowly role as a blocking force. That perceived waste of their talent prompted a heated clash with one of the US commanders. A near shouting match erupted between a US special forces Major called Jimmy, who was acting second in command of the American special forces effort, and another Australian SAS officer over the issue.

The Australians proposed to infiltrate their own troops well before the operation in a bid to undertake standard intelligence gathering, but Jimmy refused. Only later did the Australians discover the US had their own Special Forces teams going into the area. Unfortunately, says Adam, the Americans chose to infiltrate the area just a few days before the battle - insufficient time to conduct surveillance and gather intelligence of the quality that would have been provided by the Australians. Then when an American contingent of 10th Mountain Division troops (with two Australian soldiers acting as liaison officers) air assaulted into the valley they were pinned down by al-Qaeda fighters who had occupied vast areas of the high ground.

Adam says had the Australians been allowed to conduct an early infiltration up to 10 days earlier, it would "have given us a day head-start. That would have allowed us to build a good or better or more comprehensive intelligence picture, and combine that with last-minute reporting which may have led to a more successful operational outcome. With the benefit of hindsight, if we had our time again we would say 'You (the US commanders) are sending your people in broad daylight into a valley surrounded by cave systems and networks that are probably still in use, and you are going to do that without having eyes on the insurgents. It's madness.'"

But the US commanders' perceptions of the quality of Australian soldiers changed swiftly once the air assault was under way. While the Americans dropped their packs and radios during the initial attack, the Australian liaison officers retained their radios, and so were able to alert headquarters that the assault team was pinned down.

But it was four days into the operation that the Australian SAS would achieve what the might of the US army - with its satellites, unmanned spy planes, thousands of special forces soldiers and Intel sources - had failed to do. After reading up on earlier mountain battles against the Russians, Adam identified what appeared to be a potential escape route for "White-collar al-Qaeda." On previous occasions other coalition Special Forces teams had attempted to establish secret observation posts in the district, but they had barely lasted a day before being discovered by shepherds or villagers. The Australians inserted a patrol undetected to monitor the escape route. From more than 1200 meters away, high on a mountain, the patrol spotted a group of al-Qaeda figures dressed in Russian camouflage and wearing black balaclavas. They carried high-tech weapons, and appeared to be guarding a white-robed older man with a cane as they fled the battlefield.

Initially US intelligence thought the SAS had found Bin Laden, says Adam. A jet was called and dropped a 500kg bomb but it exploded over 100 meters away in a creek bed. Follow up air-raids by A-10 warthog aircraft killed a number of suspected Al Qaeda fighters but opinions are still divided about the success of the raid.

Adam says the bomb missed, resulting in the escape of the high value target, who he suspects was Tur Yuldashev, the head of the al-Qaeda-linked Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and a highly experienced commander. But a recently published book about the operation, written by respected US Army Times journalist Sean Naylor, has suggested the target was Al-Zawahiri, Osama Bin Laden's personal physician and al-Qaeda's second in command. The overall commander of the operation, Major General Franklin "Buster" Hagenbeck, recently told Time he believed the high-value target had been destroyed.

Regardless of whether the bomb missed and who the target was, Adam says the mission put the SAS at the planning table in hunting Bin Laden and resulted in significant roles in other operations. When Three Squadron rotated in during April, Adam says they achieved extraordinary feats of reconnaissance - at one stage astounding the Americans with detailed pictures of weapons being smuggled across the border in a trailer being towed by a red tractor. Even the hard-to-impress British SAS were stunned by Three Squadron's patrols, says one trooper. "The Poms could only last four days. We managed seven without resupply on the first patrol,'' he says.

And their deployment was not without some larrikin Aussie humor. As One Squadron headed out of the hanger in Kuwait on their way back to Australia, their replacements farewelled them by dropping their trousers and mooning the departing soldiers. "Three Squadron had arrived in good spirits,'' says a former Three Squadron trooper.

Rory Callinan can be emailed at Rory_Callinan@timeinc.com.au

• Rory Callinan
• In Vietnam they were dubbed Ma Rung - "Phantoms of the jungle." Creeping silently through the bush, setting elaborate ambushes or conducting surveillance, Australia's Special Air Service troopers earned the respect even of the enemy.