Anyone who travels, as I just have, on a book tour in the U.S., will return to Asia with two conflicting impressions. First, the openness of the American mind and a willingness to listen to foreign criticisms; second, the remarkable ignorance in America about the new world it has created. This has generated a curious paradox. The U.S. has done more than any other country to change the world. Yet it is one of the nations least prepared to handle the world it has changed.
The trip of U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice through Asia has briefly lifted this veil of ignorance. For seven days, Asia seeped into the consciousness of Americans. But soon it will be forgotten again. Few Americans know how dramatically Asia has changed. Fewer understand how the region will transform the world in the 21st century.
The complexities of Asia cannot be captured by the ideological U.S. belief that only the rising tide of democracy can save the world. Americans believe that the recent election in Baghdad and demonstrations in Beirut are natural, benign extensions of the democratic tide that washed Georgia and Ukraine before reaching the Middle East. But where Americans see rising tides, others see the emergence of new rivers of history. Some may lead to happy ends, some may not.
Exactly a year ago, for example, I attended a meeting of some New York intellectuals and Arab ambassadors to discuss the aftermath of the war in Iraq. As we left, one ambassador remarked to another that the U.S.-inspired elections might lead to the Shi'as achieving a dream they have held since the 7th century. But having resisted Shi'ite domination for almost 14 centuries, the Sunnis are unlikely to acquiesce quickly. Sudden democratic rule in the Middle East may not necessarily enhance American interests.
None of this is to imply that those who live in the Middle East—or Asia—want their regions to remain stagnant. A thaw has been achieved between Pakistan and India as they both get enraptured by cricket. But this is not a case of new political revolutions, but rather the rediscovery of old cultural bonds that have overcome postcolonial boundaries. Similarly, China and India are beginning to renew old ties. China's Premier Wen Jiabao has said that his forthcoming visit to New Delhi will be the most important trip of the year. As the political divide between the two countries melts, they will rediscover their ancient connections.
In its second term, the Bush administration is learning to walk delicately. The recent visits of both Rice and Bush have softened America's image in Europe. Similarly, Rice has undertaken a charm offensive that is likely to be successful in India. But these little shuffles need to be balanced by a deeper understanding of Asia's long history. Just as encouraging regime change in the Middle East may not have happy outcomes, so a lack of understanding for Chinese history could prove tragic. From the viewpoint of the Chinese people, the story of Taiwan and China is not about democracy vs. nondemocracy, as it is in the stereotypical U.S. world view. It is about Chinese memories of centuries of humiliation by foreigners who invaded and divided China. No leadership in Beijing could withstand the political force of Chinese nationalism if it were perceived to be soft on Taiwan.
Leaks from the Pentagon's forthcoming Quadrennial Defense Review suggest that China may be fingered as the next big "threat" facing the U.S. But there is no reason for America and China to dig a deep ditch between themselves. After World War II, the U.S. crafted a world order with multilateral institutions that allowed the rise of new powers—such as Japan and Germany—to happen without conflict. Similarly, if America continues to abide by the 1945 rules, China and India could also re-emerge peacefully. For this to occur, however, the U.S. needs to send clearer signals on where it stands.
Washington needs to show that, despite its enormous power, it will not attempt to dictate how other nations organize their economics and politics, but will welcome into the international system those who have their own sense of tradition, history, and the natural order of the world, even if this is very different from that of the U.S. The danger is that Americans will be mental prisoners of their benign intentions, convinced of the innate superiority of their own institutions and beliefs, and unable to see that their own dominance is as likely to breed resentment as admiration. It is time that the U.S. became more aware of this risk.