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A: Right. No, no, I'm just — but there are a series of these things. So then the President nonetheless says there will be a Palestinian state and it'll be called Palestine, which by the way solves one of the so-called final status issues by fiat. You know, just solves it.
Q: Right.
A: Then we went through a period of almost two years of kind of very tough violence with the — you remember the Dolfinarium and then the Passover massacre, when it was very clear that Yasser Arafat's leadership was going to do nothing, and then a kind of crucial decision by the Administration to say Arafat's done and the Palestinians need new leadership. That took some time to work through.
Then there's Iraq, which removes an eastern front problem for Iraq — I mean the Israelis. And then the beginnings of a process in which the President I think frankly through the confidence that he built with Prime Minister Sharon you began to get a shift in Israeli politics from the center being for a greater Israel to Likud under Ariel Sharon in the famous Herzliya speech saying we have to divide the land. That's a big shift because it's not Labor saying we have to divide the land; it's Likud saying we have to divide the land, the father of the settlement movement.
And then the unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza which we worked very hard on. And I think if there's been a disappointment, it's that — the withdrawal itself went very, very well. But there hasn't been a — the Palestinians have not been able to control the territory.
So anyway, you went through a series of things and then of course the elections. First Abbas is elected, then Hamas is elected, so there's a question of how to come to a government that will recognize Israel. So it's been a series of changes, fairly dramatic changes over the period, which now suggests to me that you're actually in a better strategic position certainly than you were in '01 but maybe than you've been in ever.
Q: OK. And on Hamas, Syria has some leverage on Hamas.
A: Yes.
Q: Quite a bit. But who has leverage on Syria? Well, not just — you've asked — been asked this already. Why not talk to Syria about that? And if you say the U.S. can't or it would be futile, are you asking other states to try to use their leverage with Syria to solve this — resolve this problem?
A: Yeah. Well, there are lots of states that have asked Syria and they essentially haven't responded. I think the best — in some ways, the pressure on Hamas seems to be coming from inside the territories where the inability to govern because of the international embargo, which by the way when we started down this road people said oh, this will never work, you won't isolate Hamas. Well, in fact, we have isolated Hamas. The international community has isolated Hamas. And now I think the pressure because they can't govern is leading them to seek other possibilities, and we'll see whether or not the Syrian-based Hamas recognizes that.
Q: I think most Americans, if they had a chance to ask you a question, Madame Secretary, would say, "Why don't we talk to Iran and Syria?" Particularly I think Syria. I think they probably draw a distinction. What would you say? Because I think it's hard sometimes for people to understand why we wouldn't talk to people. And they've heard that over the last couple of months and you seem to be saying, "I don't want to talk to those people."
A: Yeah. No, it's not —
Q: Is isolation something that we're sure is going to work or is it part of — can you just explain a little bit what your thinking is there?
A: Well, the question is how do you expect this conversation to go. What's the nature of this talk? Because in diplomacy you're never just talking. That just is a notion that is rather nave. You never just talk.
Q: Well, you have that — people have that — that's all right.
A: You're talking toward some goal or you're talking to achieve some aim or you're talking to change your relationship, but you're never just talking. When I talk to any foreign leader, I'm not just talking.
So the question is how does this conversation go. We were talking up until '05, February '05, and even though we weren't getting anywhere, you know, we kept trying to talk. But of course, then you had the Hariri assassination, which changed the dynamic considerably as the isolation of Syria grew because of their people thought — because of their potential role in that assassination.
So what is this conversation about now? Well, people say go and tell them to help stabilize Iraq. Either they have an interest in stabilizing Iraq, in which case they will because it's in their national interest, or they want us to ask them to stabilize Iraq so that they can — we can pay a price for it. I don't see other outcomes. So how does this conversation go? Well, help us stabilize Iraq. Fine. Recognize our strategic interests in Lebanon. In fact, in that (inaudible) interview, they said well, they'd have to recognize their strategic interests. Well, what do people think their strategic interest are at this point? It's to reestablish Syrian authority and dominance in Lebanon, which they're not reconciled to having lost. And it is to shave the edges off this tribunal so that it can't ensnare anybody in the Syrian regime. And even the act then of talking has consequences for people in Lebanon who begin to wonder is there some kind of deal that's going to be made.
Q: It's very helpful. It's very helpful.
A: Yeah. So the question is, you know, if you really thought you were going to get somewhere, maybe. But I don't think you're going to get anywhere and there's a cost.
Q: Right. That's it, so there's a cost in the war. I appreciate it.
Q: And similarly on Iran.
A: Talking is not going* to cost. Pardon me?
Q: Iran, you would make this — you've made a similar argument.
A: Well, Iran — no, it's not as if we haven't tried to talk to them. Twenty-seven years of policy. And we set this up very deliberately to give an opportunity to talk to the Iranians at a high level and about anything.
Q: Right. OK.
A: Open — we didn't say, oh, and by the way, when you suspend and we come to the table, we'll just talk about your nuclear weapons programs. You bring up anything you want and we'll bring up anything we want. And we did that because you — the consensus you can't break which is the consensus that's actually leading to the — had led now to the Chapter 7 resolution is that Iran needs to suspend its enrichment and reprocessing activities because while you're talking, they're improving their nuclear capability. This is not a good outcome.
And so again, what is the cost? The cost is that you give Iran a channel outside of the internationally agreed channel which is suspend and negotiate — to negotiate. So I see that one — I do see that one as different, but it — again, it has costs and it's not as if we haven't given every opportunity. You know, I remember when someone in Iran said, well, maybe they would suspend for two months. And I was asked, well, that's not nice*. Two months, let them suspend for two months, we'll get started. We'll see what happens. So we've tried to be actually very flexible and for reasons that I don't fully understand, but it may have to do with internal dynamics in Iran, they haven't been able to engage.
Q: In terms of Iran's arms (inaudible) into Iraq, the President makes a very forceful statement, says have you — are we to read from this that the U.S. would engage in cross border hot pursuit of people bringing in arms or insurgent elements into Iraq?