The Winds of Reform

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gathered support from all sides of the political spectrum. The Heritage Foundation, a conservative Washington think tank, published last month an unsparing critique of Pentagon management, arguing that complex technology is not only busting the budget but detracting from the military's ability to fight. "Tactics have been driven by technology," wrote former Army Captain George Kuhn in the report. "The evidence suggests that complex technology is usually relatively ineffective." The Council on Economic Priorities, a liberal research group in New York, also released a study of weapons procurement last month that zeroed in on the Pentagon's continuing inability to control costs. The Project on Military Procurement, run by Analyst Dina Rasor, is an independent research group in Washington that has worked to draw attention to massive cost overruns and technological failures in weapon systems.

The best way to understand the interrelated problems that the reformers hope to tackle is by examining the haphazard method by which weapons are chosen, tested and funded. The lack of coherence in the process can be seen through a simple example: the way money is spent for close air support. American and NATO defense doctrine hinges on effective close air support: the Soviets invade Central Europe, the U.S. Army's M-60 and new M-1 tanks confront them, and the U.S. Air Force is called upon to coordinate bombing and strafing attacks on enemy artillery and tanks. "Close air support is the single most important air mission of maneuver warfare," says Sprey.

The fundamental problem with close air support is that the Air Force does not like the subservient task of aiding Army troops. It provided that service grudgingly during the Viet Nam War, preferring the glory of long-range bombing runs and dogfights with MiGs. Only in the last decade has the Air Force produced a good close-support plane, the A10, which can fly slowly enough to find enemy tanks, is sturdy enough to take hits, and is capably armed with a simple and effective 30-mm cannon. Tactical Air Command pilots ridicule the A10, joking that they fear being hit from the rear by birds. In recent years, the Air Force has tried to delete the plane from its budget.

Enter congressional politics. The Senate last year eliminated funding for the A10, using the money instead for more F-16s, a faster plane that the Air Force favors but which is not suited to close air support. (It is built in Texas, home state of Armed Services Committee Chairman Tower.) But the House voted to keep the A-10 alive. Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Joseph Addabbo of New York, who is usually eager to cut military spending, is a strong proponent of the plane. (It is built on Long Island, within commuting distance of his home district.)

Enter the White House. Instead of supporting the Air Force and Republican Tower, it comes down in favor of Democrat Addabbo. Why? To win the votes of Long Island Congressmen last August for Reagan's tax increase, the White House promised to buy 20 more A-10s. At this inefficient production rate, the price of the plane has jumped from $5.9 million apiece in 1975 to $18 million (more than an F16) in 1983.

In the meantime, the Army decided to get its own close air support. But by law only the Air Force can build fixed-wing aircraft. The solution: develop a