• U.S.

Nation: Precautions Against Muslim Anger

8 minute read
TIME

The U.S. reduces its presence in eleven nations

A wave of anti-American violence continued to sweep through the Muslim world. Two weeks ago, there were mob attacks on American outposts from Turkey to Bangladesh and the burning of the U.S. embassy in Pakistan. Last week there were more demonstrations, in Thailand, the Philippines and Kuwait; on Sunday, 2,000 rioting Libyans assaulted the U.S. embassy in Tripoli, but there were no American casualties.

Understandably, the Carter Administration remained deeply worried about the fragile state of U.S. relations with the Muslim world. The series of protests had been precipitated by Muslim outrage over the false charge that the U.S. was involved in the seizure of Mecca’s Sacred Mosque (see following story).

The eruptions have also prompted a question among startled Americans: Why do the world’s Muslims seem to harbor such hostility for the U.S.? As President Carter said at his press conference last week, “We have the deepest respect and reverence for Islam and all those who share the Muslim faith.” The explanation for the anger cannot be strictly historical. While Iranian resentment over Washington’s longtime links with the Shah is understandable, the U.S. never colonized Islamic lands as did, for example, France and Britain, nor does the U.S. have an appreciable Muslim minority, as does the Soviet Union, which has grown increasingly apprehensive that Khomeini’s brand of revolutionary zealotry could infect its 50 million Muslim citizens.

The U.S. enjoys close relations with a number of Islamic countries, including Egypt, Morocco and Saudi Arabia. It is hard to escape the conclusion that in those Muslim countries where hostility toward the U.S. is most intense, the explanation lies as much in cultural differences as in history. Many Muslims feel a profound ambivalence toward the West, and especially toward the U.S. They are contemptuous of Western “materialism” and “decadence,” yet they are also dependent upon Western technology and skill. Above all, they fear that Western influences will dilute and eventually destroy the Muslim way of life.

Whatever the reasons for the general phenomenon, there were lingering, legitimate fears in Washington that anti-U.S. riots could occur again, as long as the confrontation with Iran remained at flashpoint. Accordingly, the State Department last week called for the departure of all nonessential personnel and dependents among the 1,200 Americans based in elev en Muslim countries and officially discouraged Americans from traveling to them. A similar order had been issued earlier for Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The plan was to reduce the size of the American official community and curtail the travel of U.S. citizens in countries where 1) there has been violence already, 2) Iranian sympathizers are strong enough to cause trouble, or 3) local security forces may be too weak to cope with mob violence. The evacuation order was applied to Iran last February at a time of growing unrest in Tehran. Afghanistan, where U.S. Ambassador Adolph Dubs was murdered at about the same time, was added to the list a few months later. The exodus from Pakistan was deemed “a prudent, precautionary measure” after the embassy attack two weeks ago in which two U.S. servicemen were killed. The eleven other countries in which the American presence is to be reduced to a necessary minimum:

Libya. The only thing that Washington can count on with Strongman Muammar Gaddafi is his unpredictability. Although both, are Islamic fundamentalists, Gaddafi was on the outs with Khomeini as the result of the mysterious disappearance in Libya last year of the Shi’ite Imam of Lebanon, Moussa Sadr. At last month’s Arab summit conference in Tunis, however, Gaddafi strongly defended Khomeini’s actions. But last week Italian Journalist Oriana Fallaci quoted him as urging Khomeini to release the U.S. hostages.

Lebanon. While world attention has centered on the bitter feud between Maronite Christians and the Palestinians, a potential new source of trouble is Lebanon’s 900,000 Shi’ites. Until now, the Shi’ites have been seen as docile farmers in the south who wanted to get rid of Palestine Liberation Organization guerrillas and thus end the incessant Israeli artillery raids in the area. Khomeini’s fervor has infected the Lebanese Shi’ites; two weeks ago, they joined Iranian students in an attack on the U.S. embassy in Beirut that was dispelled by Syrian peacekeeping forces.

Syria. President Hafez Assad heads a government dominated by members of the Alawite minority sect (related to the Shi’ite branch of Islam) that rules over a restless Sunni majority. So far, Assad has been able to stifle dissent and outcries over corruption (including the wealth of his brother, General Rifaat Assad). But the opposition is gaining, with the help of the Muslim Brotherhood, a local offshoot of the fundamentalist movement that grew up in Egypt before World War II.

Iraq. Under President Saddam Hussein, Iraq is Khomeini’s nemesis, or at least his nearest one. It too has a Shi’ite majority (about 60% of its population), but it is ruled by Sunni Muslims. Khomeini, who has not forgotten that Iraq expelled him in 1977, has called on Iraqi Shi’ites to “rise up against [their] oppressors.” Iraq has responded by hinting that it might aid Iran’s Kurdish and Arab minorities in their struggle for autonomy. Such a move could backfire on Iraq, which has a restless Kurdish minority of its own. In response to Khomeini’s challenge, left-leaning Iraq is already drawing closer to Saudi Arabia, with which it has had cool relations in the past.

Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Except for last week’s demonstration at the U.S. embassy in Kuwait, there have been no serious political stirrings among the Shi’ite residents of the Gulf states, many of whom are Iranian workers. The Shi’ites are in the majority in Bahrain and in the Emirate of Dubai, and constitute substantial minorities in the other states. Kuwait is the most prosperous of the group (with a per capita G.N.P. of $11,850). As in Qatar and the Emirates, the Shi’ite community shares in the state’s wealth and political power. The Kuwaiti royal family also uneasily pays handsome contributions to the P.L.O. and strives to maintain a middle course in Arab politics.

Bahrain, with a corrupt and graft-ridden government, is the most vulnerable of the Gulf states. A chain of islands off the Saudi coast, Bahrain has no oil of its own but is the nearby banking center for Saudi Arabia and the offshore playground for wealthy Saudis (liquor flows freely, and European prostitutes cost $1,000 a night). Khomeini has vowed to recapture Bahrain, which was under Persian sovereignty between 1602 and 1782.

Oman. This sultanate occupies the southern tip of the strategic Strait of Hormuz, through which flows more than half the crude oil used by the West. It remains a quiet supporter of U.S. initiatives in the Middle East, including the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Western experts say that some 200 Egyptian officers and noncoms are attached to its armed forces, which also have the guidance of some 700 British military officers. Though the Shah’s forces helped Oman defeat a rebellion by the Marxist Dhofar rebels, Oman has managed to stay on speaking terms with Khomeini.

North Yemen. The U.S. has supplied the country with some $500 million in weaponry, mainly to reassure the Saudis of American determination in the area, but such deliveries have barely affected the basic insecurity of the regime. Across the moonscape border lies South Yemen, the only Marxist state in the Arab world, with its Soviet naval base at Aden and training camps for foreign terrorists. The recent history of the two Yemens is one of constant sabotage and guerrilla warfare.

Bangladesh. Although far from the center of Muslim turmoil, Dacca was the scene of an attack on an American diplomatic mission two weeks ago. Washington’s main concern is that the local armed forces may not be strong enough to supply quick defense against a similar attack in the future, and sees no reason to endanger its citizens unnecessarily.

Having decided to play it safe in these eleven Islamic states, the U.S. also concluded that in several other countries there was little risk to American lives and property. In both Turkey and Saudi Arabia, the Administration believes, local armed forces, together with U.S. Army contingents in the area, could adequately protect American interests, nor did the Administration feel that any special precautions were necessary for Americans in Algeria or Egypt. Washington’s relations with Algiers have improved since the death of President Houari Boumedienne. As for Egypt, says a U.S. diplomat just returned from Cairo, “There is no better time or place to be an American; the friendliness is overwhelming.”

More Must-Reads from TIME

Contact us at letters@time.com