The Americas: Dealing with

Behind the Iron Curtain, the third anniversary of Fidel Castro’s victory was greeted with a flood of congratulatory telegrams—including “many requests” from Russian parents for permission to name newborn offspring (Fidel). In Havana, Castro led into the anniversary with another of those speeches bragging about how cleverly he had concealed his Communism in the early days. “If, while we were in the Sierra Maestra, we had said, ‘We are Marxist-Leninists,’ it is possible that we would never have been able to descend to the lowlands.” But among the other nations of the hemisphere, Castro’s third anniversary was a reminder of a decision to be made at the Jan. 22 meeting at Punta del Este, Uruguay, on the problem of what to do about Communist-dominated Cuba.

Castro’s own braggadocio has somewhat brightened the chances of a joint stand against him at Punta del Este. Before he made his boast, such pivotal Latin American leaders as Argentina’s President Arturo Frondizi were dead set against anything—even mere disapproval—that could be construed as intervention. Last week, at Palm Beach on his way home from a world tour, Frondizi wound up 1½ hours of talk with President Kennedy with an agreement that some action should come out of the Uruguay conference.

Frondizi is still opposed to such anti-Castro steps as diplomatic and economic sanctions. His argument is that sanctions would play into Castro’s hands by dividing the hemisphere into two debating camps: the seven nations that still maintain contact with Cuba v. the 13 that have broken relations.* As an alternative, Frondizi presented Kennedy with a new version of an idea proposed by Venezuela’s President Rómulo Betancourt. Instead of flatly condemning Cuba or Castro by name, each country would be asked to sign a declaration that would set standards—e.g., a freely elected representative government, total respect for human rights —for membership in the community of American nations. Castro’s dictatorship could not and would not qualify, and could thus be ostracized.

Frigid Visage. What happens next—whether Cuba will be blackballed from the OAS, or isolated by sanctions—Frondizi did not say. Yet even this very mild and tentative stand was apparently worrisome to Castro. He sent his Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Carlos Olivares Sánchez flying through Latin America in an attempt to forestall any action at all at Punta del Este.

In Uruguay, Olivares told Chief of State Eduardo Victor Haedo that Cuba hoped that her right of “self-determination” (even without elections) would be respected at Punta del Este. Olivares de livered his message to Chile, then landed in Buenos Aires to see Frondizi. Castro’s messenger was bluntly told that Frondizi was “too busy.” After an hour with the Argentine Foreign Minister, Olivares marched out frozen-faced and silent. Shortly after the meeting, the Argentine Foreign Office released a pointed com muniqué repudiating Communism and ex pressing “enthusiastic support” for President Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress.

* The seven with relations: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Uruguay. The 13 without: Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the U.S., Venezuela.