NATO: Burying the Discords

The 15 foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization met in Paris last week in a chastened mood. Britain and France were sulky with the touchiness of those who know they have been found wrong, still think they were right, but are anxious to get back in everybody’s good graces. With Russia putting on a show of brutal power in Hungary, the smaller nations had had a terrifying glimpse into a future in which the three senior partners might be split. There was sudden new interest in NATO’s defenses, and an urgent search for ways to make sure such a split would not happen again.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, showing little effect of his recent cancer operation, arrived, talking generally of economic aid to see Europe through the oil crisis, and of “burying past discords.” In private conferences, first with Pineau, then with Lloyd. Dulles assured them of U.S. backing for quick clearance of the Suez Canal. At the opening session Dulles lectured the assembled ministers like a Presbyterian elder, pointing out that morality is the real binding force of the Western alliance. With pointed reference to Britain and France, he said that maintenance of moral pressure was a vital factor in bringing about the disintegration of the Soviet-Chinese system.

Keeping in Step. After that, the NATO nations fell over each other in proposing new devices to keep future policies in step. Italy’s Gaetano Martino proposed a permanent consultative body to develop a “common Western policy” for areas both inside and outside the NATO areas. West Germany’s Heinrich von Brentano suggested an amendment to the treaty itself which would require each NATO nation to consult others on problems affecting the alliance. France’s Christian Pineau wanted obligatory consultation on all foreign policies. Even more grandiosely, Britain’s Selwyn Lloyd suggested a “grand design” of an Atlantic Pact superstate complete with parliament.

The report of the “three wise men”—Canada’s Lester Pearson, Italy’s Martino, Norway’s Halvard Lange—was less ambitious. While arguing broadly that “there cannot be unity in defense and disunity in foreign policy,” its recommendations were hedged carefully with a sense of reality. Its chief recommendation: “Member governments should not adopt firm policies or make major political pronouncements on matters which significantly affect the alliance” without advance consultation with the NATO council.

The NATO ministers chorused approval, and Dulles called the report a “careful, scholarly, wise work.” But then Dulles offered some reservations. The U.S. has pacts with 44 countries, he pointed out, and only 14 are included in NATO. If, for instance, the Chinese Communists attacked Formosa, the U.S. would be obligated to react without consulting NATO. This seemed to be exactly the argument Britain and France had used after their attack on Suez, but the difference, said Dulles, was that the U.S. had explained its stand on Formosa to NATO well in advance.

French papers at once angrily charged the U.S. with an “apparent desire to impose on her allies a code of international rules, all the while reserving the right not to respect them herself.” NATO’s new Secretary-General Paul-Henri Spaak (see box) was more understanding. “After all, you couldn’t expect a country the size of the U.S. to promise to consult a little country like Belgium before taking action on every problem posed to it anywhere in the world.” The council approved the three wise men’s recommendation that

NATO members should try to settle disputes among themselves (e.g., Cyprus) within the NATO organization itself, empowered the Secretary-General to offer his good offices in the mediation, thereby making the job more than the mere functionary role it had been under Lord Ismay.

Comedown. When it came time to examine NATO’s defenses, there was little argument, but not much cause for cheer. Faced with the economic crisis brought on by Suez, Britain told the council frankly that it could no longer maintain its defense expenditures, which are currently running at $4.2 billion a year or 9% of the total national product. France admitted that there was no prospect of bringing back the four divisions it pulled out of NATO’s shield for service in North Africa.

The comedown was considerable from the high hopes of Lisbon in 1952, when the NATO council set a goal of 65 “ready” divisions. In 1954 NATO cut back its hopes, adopted a “new look” strategy based on the use of tactical atomic weapons behind a thin “plateglass” shield of infantry, and put the new target at 30 divisions. The plate glass was getting thinner all the time. Last week NATO could field only 15 “shield” divisions, of which five were U.S., four British, to defend the line from the Alps to the Baltic.

The cutbacks were not made in the name of new look strategy, but of old-fashioned hardship. “If the burden is too great to carry, We cannot goon carrying it,” said Chancellor of the Exchequer Macmillan. His remarks were directed primarily at thriving Germany, which is spending only a modest $280 million on its lagging defense, and has threatened to stop all support payments for the four British divisions in Germany after May 1957. The British taxpayer, Macmillan made clear, was fed up with Germany’s letting Britain carry Germany’s defenses. Since Germany had to confess that it could supply only 360,000 German troops instead of the 500,000 it had promised, West Germany’s Heinrich von Brentano agreed to make up the difference by continuing to pay British support costs.

“Dual Purpose.” One after another, NATO’s European members insisted that their economies could not stand any stronger drain on their resources. The answer, they argued, was to provide more firepower with fewer men. How? Equip all NATO divisions with tactical atomic weapons. Since Britain’s atomic production is too limited to supply even its own divisions adequately, this came down to a demand on the U.S. Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson pointed out that U.S. law bans the sale of U.S. atomic weapons, but he agreed that the U.S. would supply and train Europeans in the use of “dual purpose” weapons which can carry either conventional or nuclear warheads.

With that, the U.S.’s European allies would have to be content. Many had hoped for a more sweeping U.S. commitment, both military and political. But most were grateful for the simple proof that the alliance was still more important to its members than their quarrels.