Big Country, Small Changes

China’s need for political reform to match its economic progress was noted as long ago as August 18, 1980, when Deng Xiaoping gave a speech critical of concentrating power in the hands of Communist Party secretaries at all levels. Seven years later, Zhao Ziyang, then CCP secretary, proposed “separation of party and government.” During the massive public demonstrations of 1989, reporters and editors for the official People’s Daily newspaper called for an end to censorship of reporting on government abuse and corruption. Twice in press conferences during his tenure as Premier, Zhu Rongji has spoken in favor of carrying out competitive elections at many levels of government.

All these proposals came from within the party. Yet political reform has made scant headway, and there’s little reason to be optimistic that new leadership under Hu Jintao will be more progressive. Over the years, relatively small steps have been taken—conducting contested village elections, allowing greater activism by people’s congresses, easing censorship of non-political reporting, and institutionalizing an unwritten rule for the retirement of top cadres above the age of 70. But these moves are dwarfed by the steady, sweeping progress of economic reform and the social turbulence it has generated.

History has vindicated the wisdom of Deng’s strategy of gradualism in economic reform. China’s ongoing transition to a market economy has been accompanied by sustained high growth rates, a feat eluding countries that have tried shock therapy. But time and again leaders have drawn back from political reforms they knew were necessary, fearing that any relaxation of control would uncork a torrent of demands from dissatisfied citizens—laid-off workers, over-taxed peasants, outlawed religious groups and other aggrieved mainlanders. Stability through repression has been preferred to building more open institutions that could process society’s demands.

This short-sighted, put-out-the-fire approach to the challenges of social change has exacted a heavy toll. The government is continuously condemned by other countries for its draconian domestic policies. Worse, there has been a deepening of social conflicts, as evidenced by the current wave of worker protests in Liaoyang and elsewhere, that could be managed better by a more open system. The party is often surprised by unrest because citizens have no legitimate means of expression; grievances simmer until they explode.

Unfortunately, the new leadership coming to power under Hu is unlikely to rise to the challenge. To be sure, some of the new crop are favorably disposed towards elements of political reform. Second-ranking leader Li Ruihuan is likely to favor increasing liberalization of the media and, as chairman of the National People’s Congress, will further consolidate that body’s independent legislative role. Fifth-ranking Zeng Qinghong, Jiang Zemin’s closest political aide, is a pragmatist who might support more competitive elections and independent newspapers not controlled by the party. And security chief Luo Gan, ranked number four in the upcoming leadership, is thought to favor reform in the court and prison systems to make them more professional and less abusive. He also has backed changes in the residency registration system that will diminish discrimination against peasants.

Unfortunately, Hu is unlikely to be a leader in promoting even these cautious changes. After a career eschewing independent deeds, he doesn’t bring to office any bold visions. Nor does he have a strong power base in the party other than his tried-and-tested ability not to alienate his older political sponsors. His Standing Committee colleagues Li, Zeng, and Luo each possess stronger political resources. Hu’s value to his colleagues, and hence his political survival, rests on his ability to balance all factions. He is unlikely to launch or even to support changes perceived as risky by any member of the leadership or by influential retired elders.

It is a safe bet that the new leading group will move China further toward a market economy and integration with world markets, following the policy trajectory of the last twenty years. They may also align China more closely with the U.S., provided American policy is nonconfrontational enough to enable them to do so. But the chances are poor that they will carry out the needed, bold political reforms. If they do not, however, social pressures will continue to build, with results that may eventually be dangerous to the new leadership and potentially to the outside world.