In the scorching heat of the Palestinian territories, you wouldn’t think a woolly ski mask would be popular. But for Palestinian militants, the ski mask is an essential fashion accessory, just like the Kalashnikov assault rifle. The mask confers a sinister power, anonymity and a definite edge. The idea is that you don’t know who is shooting at you from behind the ski mask, so you can’t take revenge.
In Gaza the members of Hamas have stripped off their masks, because they are the victors. For months Hamas and its rival, Fatah, loyal to President Mahmoud Abbas, brawled for power in the Palestinian enclave of Gaza–until June 10, when the shooting erupted into a climactic, vicious battle. Hamas didn’t so much destroy the Fatah forces as cow them into surrender: only 5,000 of the 45,000 men on Abbas’ payroll actually put up the pretense of a fight. And for the most part, top Fatah commanders deserted their men, either fleeing on foot to Egypt or aboard a small armada of fishing boats.
The war for Gaza is over. After the firing ceased, Gazans dashed to the bazaar to stock up on emergency supplies, certain that Israel would close the borders. Then families flocked to the beach to celebrate an end to months of fighting. The Islamic militants of Hamas–whose charter calls for the destruction of the Jewish state, an aspiration the group has sought to fulfill through scores of suicide bombings against Israel–are now the lords of Gaza, with 1.5 million Palestinians under their rule. The end of the power struggle in Gaza marks the opening of a critical new chapter in the Middle East that could determine whether the entire region can be saved from anarchic internecine warfare. The collapse of Palestinian unity is the latest manifestation of a phenomenon roiling the Arab world: the rise of a generation of angry, hungry and radical young men who refuse to play by the old rules. Until that anger is defused, any prospect of a functioning Palestinian state or a lasting settlement between Israel and the Arabs will stay beyond reach. Figuring out how to deal with that challenge remains among the U.S.’s most pressing foreign policy dilemmas.
There are no easy answers. For the time being, the U.S. is pinning its hopes on Abbas, a moderate secularist who has been the titular leader of the Palestinians since the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004. Abbas has dismissed the Hamas-led government elected in January 2006 and appointed a new Cabinet of technocrats. To avoid a repeat of Fatah’s defeat in Gaza, the U.S. moved swiftly to bolster Abbas in the West Bank by lifting an embargo on aid funds for the Palestinians. The new strategy–shared by the Israelis, the Europeans and the Bush Administration–is to flood Abbas’ government with cash and attempt to transform the West Bank, while putting Gazans on a diet of limited humanitarian aid in the hope that they will ultimately revolt against their Hamas masters.
There’s just one problem with that strategy: it won’t work. The world clamped a boycott on the Palestinians after Hamas’ victory over Fatah in the January 2006 elections; but as Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser under President Jimmy Carter, says, that U.S.-Israeli policy “put a lot of pressure on the Palestinians in Gaza, which helped to radicalize them without any compensatory relaxation for the Palestinians on the West Bank.” The U.S.’s new “West Bank first” strategy aims to correct that shortcoming, but given the Palestinians’ defiant mood, the tardy gift could turn into a nasty surprise for Abbas. Robert Malley, a Middle East expert with the International Crisis Group, says that “we’ve lost so much credibility among Palestinians that the people we try to help, we hurt, and those we try to hurt, we often inadvertently help.”
So what should be done? If the new course charted by Israel and the White House–of coddling Abbas and slapping down Hamas–seems likely to fail, what might succeed? In the long run, squeezing the Gaza Strip won’t help moderate Palestinians any more than pushing democracy on them did. Avoiding a takeover of the Palestinian cause by even more radical elements will instead require a more pragmatic and clear-eyed strategy than the Bush Administration has so far pursued. And that means that sooner or later, the U.S. and Israel will have to find a way to engage with Hamas.
GROUNDS FOR COMPROMISE Hamas’ vistory has complicated the Bush Administration’s hopes of using Abbas as a defense against the rise of Islamic radicalism. After Hamas’ triumph in the 2006 elections, Prime Minister Ismail Haniya’s government was was denied aid by the quartet–the U.S., the European Union, the U.N. and Russia–for refusing to accept Israel’s existence, renounce violence and adhere to past peace accords signed by Israel and the Palestinians. And yet Hamas still gained support, largely because Abbas failed to rid himself of the corrupt officials that had turned the Fatah movement into a band of gangsters and mercenaries. To Palestinians, Hamas seemed disciplined and more honest, and Palestinians blamed the U.S. and Israel, not the Islamists, for the boycott’s miseries. Meanwhile, Hamas sought and received backing from two of Israel’s chief nemeses, Iran and Syria.
Given that track record, the U.S. and Israel are justifiably reluctant to deal with Hamas. But failing to do so risks strengthening the organization’s radical voices. That’s why it’s time for a different approach–one that can protect Israel’s interests while still reaching out to forces within Hamas that might steer Gaza in a more constructive direction. True, Hamas refuses to recognize Israel, but there are some signs that it sees compromise to be in its self-interest. Hamas has reason to avoid provoking Israel–in part because, as Major General Giora Eiland, retired head of Israel’s National Security Council, says, “military targets in Gaza just got a lot clearer. There’s only one color now–and that’s Hamas.” On June 20, Israel fired missiles at rocket launchers in northern Gaza and engaged in a firefight with militants, killing four. Hamas leaders know that their first order of business is restoring law and order, not starting a war with Israel. Hamas has tried to pressure other militant cells to stop shooting rockets into southern Israel.
Some Hamas leaders say they may be willing to go even further. A senior Hamas official has told TIME that the militants are prepared to talk with both Israel and Washington. “We hope that the Americans will stop being guided by Israel,” the Hamas official said. “And instead of going through the Saudis and the Egyptians, they should talk directly with us. We may disagree, but we are prepared to meet them.”
Will anyone take up the offer? The Bush Administration probably won’t consider any contact with Hamas until the Gaza leadership mends ties with Abbas’ West Bank government. That may yet happen. Though Hamas was merciless against its foes in the first hours of the Gaza conquest, the group declared an amnesty for Fatah’s thousands of fighters, including a dozen senior officials. Even after Abbas kicked Hamas out of his government, the group has been careful not to pick fights with him. The group’s political leader, Khaled Mashaal, declared that “Abbas has legitimacy … he is an elected President, and we will cooperate with him in the national interest.” From his exile base in Damascus, Mashaal also said Hamas would abide by past resolutions it has signed with Fatah, including one that “honored” previous Palestinian accords with Israel.
THE CASE FOR ENGAGEMENT
Of course, Israelis have no reason to take a figure like Mashaal at his word–and many believe that now is the time to shut out Hamas completely. Israel can punish Hamas by simply choking off supplies going into Gaza, and officials say they have every intention of using this weapon. Sixty percent of Gaza’s electricity, 100% of its gas supplies and 40% of its water come from Israel and can easily be shut off. But twisting the screw too far could lead to calamity. John Ging, head of U.N. efforts to provide emergency food supplies to Gaza’s residents, points out that “for the past 18 months, the people of Gaza have been living in a situation of relentless decline, and this foments a dynamic of violence, not peace and stability.”
Even if cutting off Gaza brings down Hamas, the alternative could prove to be a whole lot worse. If Hamas fails, hard-line jihadist factions, including al-Qaeda, which are flourishing amid Gaza’s poverty and misery, may fill the gap. “If Hamas can break the back of these big, powerful clans, then they can bring a measure of order to Gaza,” says Nicholas Pelham, an International Crisis Group senior analyst in Jerusalem.
If that happens, it’s not unthinkable that Hamas will emerge as a greater force for stability than Abbas’ Fatah. For all the funds and assistance that the U.S. and Europe will shower upon Abbas, there is no guarantee that his Fatah forces can turn the West Bank into a beacon of democracy and prosperity. Israeli intelligence officers say they are worried about the possibility of warfare erupting among Fatah’s many, often rival militias. And according to Abdul Sattar Kassem, a political scientist at Nablus’ an-Najah National University, West Bankers will turn against Abbas if they see fellow Palestinians suffering in Gaza. “This will bring more support for Hamas in the West Bank. People will take the foreign money, but they will whisper their support for Hamas,” Kassem says.
That’s all the more reason that the U.S. and its partners, in addition to trying to support the Palestinian government in the West Bank, must find ways to bolster responsible leaders in Gaza too. In the short term, that doesn’t have to involve direct talks with Hamas leaders like Mashaal and Haniya, which would violate U.S. antiterrorism laws. But Washington can encourage Arab governments in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt, to reach out to pragmatic figures like U.S.-educated Ziad Abou Amar, a respected Palestinian academic with good contacts in the West and Gaza. Other go-betweens include doctors, businessmen and engineers, many of whom served in the previous Hamas cabinet. They don’t belong to the Islamic movement, but their advice is often heeded by Hamas.
Crushing Hamas may be a chimerical goal, but reforming it need not be, if the U.S., Israel and its allies can devise ways to work with the Islamists in areas of mutual interest. A senior Israeli intelligence officer says, “If Hamas wants to maintain a reasonable life in Gaza, with gas, electricity and food coming in, they’ll have to deal with the ‘Israeli devil’ a hundred times a day.” That kind of engagement holds at least as much potential for progress as the U.S. policy of weeding out extremists and dealing only with pliable, so-called moderates. Reaching out to Hamas could curb the militants’ extremist behavior toward Israel. Or may end in failure. In the Middle East today those odds are about as much as you can hope for.
Split Personalities. A look at the struggle for the soul of the Palestinian people
Separated by 30 miles, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank no longer share the same government. With Gaza under Hamas control, the U.S. and Israel are putting the West Bank first
GAZA
Ismail Haniya
The Hamas veteran and former Prime Minister has lost his official title, but he still retains authority in Gaza. He reports to Hamas political leader Khaled Mashaal, who lives in Damascus
Mahmoud al-Zahar
A co-founder of Hamas in Gaza, he served as Foreign Minister in Haniya’s government. Known as a hardliner, he has said Hamas “will not compromise one inch” with Israel
Mohammed Deif
The commander of the military wing of Hamas, he is suspected by Israel of involvement in suicide bombings. He is said to have been seriously wounded by an Israeli airstrike in July 2006
WEST BANK
Mahmoud Abbas
The titular leader of the Palestinians, Abbas has served as President since 2005. He has the backing of the U.S. and Israel, but his Fatah movement has lost credibility with the public
Salam Fayyad
The former World Bank official has been tapped by Abbas as Prime Minister of a new government in the West Bank. Fayyad received his Ph.D. in economics in the U.S. and is well regarded in Washington
Abd al-Razzaq al-Yahya
A longtime commander in the Palestine Liberation Organization, he will serve as Interior Minister in the new Cabinet. A previous stint in that post lasted just four months THE TWO TERRITORIES [This article contains a detailed map and a complex diagram. Please see hardcopy of magazine.]
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