Divide and Rule

Anxious to head off further rural unrest, China’s leaders have greatly stepped up efforts to appease popular discontent and rein in wayward local officials. In 2004, Premier Wen Jiabao pledged to abolish all agricultural taxes in five years, then followed through three years ahead of schedule; in 2005, he warned local officials to avoid “historic blunders”; and last month, Beijing launched a campaign to “build a new socialist countryside,” vowing to “give more and take less.”

Yet the central government has so far failed to address the main political cause of the rising number of protests: farmers lack the right to act as a legitimate interest group. It’s true that villagers have a constitutional right to lodge complaints against officials who violate the law or neglect their duties. They can also sue local governments for unlawful administrative acts, file petitions, and even reject illegal, local fees. But these rights are limited in that villagers are only allowed to challenge local governments individually, not in groups. Any effort to organize for political purposes attracts suspicion and, often, repression. While Beijing admits that more than 80% of the demands raised by protesters in so-called “collective incidents” are lawful or reasonable, officials at all levels are united in showing no tolerance for protest leaders, labeling them “bad elements,” “thuggish idlers,” “individuals with ulterior motives,” even “agents of overseas anti-China forces.”

Most rural folk have a very different take, regarding protest leaders as heroic representatives deserving of support and protection. Yet even when challenging unlawful local decisions, protest leaders are harshly reminded that they have no right to represent their constituents: they are fined, beaten up, detained, sent to labor education camps, or imprisoned. But repression, either by the police or hired local thugs, generates even stronger popular support for protest leaders. And after a crackdown, the protest organizers often feel they have no choice but to make a bigger ruckus. This cycle of repression spurring escalation is the key reason for the explosion of large-scale incidents.

Since most protests aim to defend rights recognized by Beijing that are being violated locally, an obvious solution is to narrow the gap between what the central government promises and local officials deliver. But can Beijing convince these officials to do its bidding? Top-down measures have largely proven ineffective, and China’s leaders remain unwilling to ally with mistreated villagers by introducing democratic elections at the township or county levels. In the meantime, villagers can try to defend their rights individually but can’t negotiate with local officials as organized groups. This strategy has not only led some protest leaders to abandon peaceful petitioning in favor of disruptive, large-scale protests, but has transformed some “rightful resisters” into disillusioned dissidents who no longer have faith in Beijing’s good intentions.

It remains to be seen whether China’s leaders have the courage and wisdom to overcome their distrust of an organized citizenry. One thing, however, is certain. Until they secure the right to defend themselves in organized groups, Chinese villagers will continue to launch more and more protests to uphold rights they believe they have, but that local officials have failed to respect.