This illustration, taken on May 2, 2011, in Kaufbeuren, Germany, shows the websites of different newspapers reporting on the death of Osama bin Laden
The dramatic announcement of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden's death on May 1 came too late for most Europeans to hear about it in real time. But by the earliest hours of Monday morning, both regular citizens and the officials in Europe tasked with protecting them from terrorist strikes were in full debate about how bin Laden's killing might change the activity and determination of jihadists plotting to strike around the globe.
Perhaps not surprisingly, most experts say the charismatic leader's death represents a symbolic blow to the extremists who looked up to him — and presents surviving al-Qaeda officials in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region with a real challenge regarding how they will operate in his absence. But analysts add that it probably won't change the mechanics of the Islamist terrorism threatening the world.
"It's likely to have the greatest direct impact in the upper echelons of al-Qaeda's command, which in turn will create even more problems for its leaders to mount very spectacular, complex and well-organized attacks around the world as a follow-up to 9/11," says one European security official who works closely with intelligence agencies. "But the vast majority of plots or strikes we see in the world [these days] are the kind carried out by small cells of local operatives, whose contacts with al-Qaeda [in the Pakistani border region] are minimal — usually with medium-level figures, if at all. Bin Laden's death may have a short-term emotional impact on those far-flung extremists, but that won't alter the way they function."
A French counterterrorism official concurs. "Bin Laden was most effective in projecting the distinct al-Qaeda ideology and assembling disparate radicals around what extremists consider his unique moral authority," the official says. "That's gone now, and with it the personal dedication with which jihadist organizations around the world swore their allegiance. None of those will turn their backs on al-Qaeda or stop using terrorism as the main arm in their international struggle. But there is no single leader they'll all look up and dedicate their efforts to, which represents a real change."
Yet this official says that's a largely symbolic and psychological factor. He notes that al-Qaeda was never as structured and centralized as many people once believed. The functioning of its followers and sympathizers around the globe — and particularly in Europe — has become increasingly autonomous, especially since the NATO-led military operation forced al-Qaeda's leadership out of its former haven in Afghanistan for refuge in Pakistan. In recent years, experts say, the standard terrorism cell in Europe has evolved to become smaller, often self-constituted, and usually gets minimal advice or direction from mentors in Southeast Asia. In some cases, a cell member may get all the training and instruction required during a visit to Pakistan, relying on that to mount plots after returning to Europe.
That appears to be the case with a trio of suspects apprehended in Germany on April 29 as they were allegedly preparing to test homemade explosives for a planned attack. The three men — one of whom reportedly received training last year at an al-Qaeda camp in Pakistan — had been under police surveillance for six months, and had purportedly discussed targeting public transportation in a strike. Scores of cells that have staged attacks or have been thwarted in Europe while plotting over the past decade share similar profiles — and most received limited direct assistance from al-Qaeda or radicals directly tied to the organization.
Another example: the three suspected extremists arrested in Norway in July 2010 on suspicions that they were planning to make bombs for use on undetermined targets abroad. That group was at one time in contact with an al-Qaeda leader who has since been killed in Pakistan. That leader had put similar bombing plots in motion — one in Manchester, England, and another targeting the New York City subway system, which was busted in 2009 — in a trio of planned strikes operating independently of one another, and with little guidance beyond his initial instructions. Most cells, authorities say, don't involve such high-level al-Qaeda input.
"Al-Qaeda is essential as inspiration — and, at times, with training and direction," the French official says. "But what radicals in Europe and elsewhere in the world are finding and using for indoctrination and terror resources on the Internet today are more dangerous to us than what comes to them from Pakistan, much less from bin Laden or his circle of commanders."
Still, bin Laden's personal force as a symbolic and inspirational figure to admirers — including many who never became active in jihad — raises the risk that some may now find sufficient motivation in his death to want to seek revenge through attacks. However, this factor is probably not a game changer, some suggest.
"It's a concern, but I'd argue that if you're involved in or even considering violent jihad in the first place, having one more excuse to justify that with isn't going to change a lot," the European official says. "With the 10 years [since] Sept. 11 on the horizon, and other factors also looming, we'd already entered a pretty tense period for possible terrorism before bin Laden's killing. His death adds a bit to that tension, but not all that much. Plus, if anyone who'd been bent on attacking is now even more anxious to do so, it could be the extra emotion and fury will make them a bit more vulnerable to tipping their hand."