Taliban Recede: Coalition or Winter's Advance?

For U.S.-led forces, breaking the Taliban's grip on the insurgents' home province of Kandahar has been a costly slog. The year 2010 was the deadliest yet in the Afghan war, with one-third more coalition casualties than in the previous year, most of them Americans in combat operations in the Taliban stronghold in the south. U.S. military officials insist the coalition has made major inroads, as attested to in part by the losses. For many area residents, however, the tactical gains touted by the White House in the latest war review had another cost: thousands of Afghans who fled the hostilities have returned to find their property damaged or destroyed, with reports of a number of hamlets entirely leveled.

For all the bitterness surrounding displacement and loss of property, Afghan officials and ordinary citizens in the three key districts surrounding Kandahar city agree that security has improved — at least for the time being. Changes are perhaps most pronounced in Arghandab, an ambush-ready river valley of grape and pomegranate orchards, where the Taliban used to control clusters of villages. Some American units lost more than half their men in the region this year. In October, the district shook almost around the clock from air strikes and firefights. But during December, displaced natives trickled back. Muhibullah, 36, a fruit merchant near the front gate of the district center, says business has picked up. "Now there are no Taliban in Arghandab, and we feel secure," he says, a change he chalks up mostly to winter but also to the U.S. military push that left the "trees naked," making it hard for insurgents to hide.

In Panjwai district, another site on an important militant access route, the infusion of U.S. forces has given a boost to embattled Canadian ones. Fresh from a trip to Zangabad, a long-standing Taliban redoubt, District Governor Haji Baran asserts that the shadow insurgent government has been evicted and that "the situation is calm now ... There's not as much fear of the Taliban." Although concerns remain that displaced militants will try to assassinate local officials to project an outsize threat, Baran says his ability to visit an area that was off-limits for much of the year was a clear sign of improvement. He credits a skein of new Afghan and U.S. security installations and added boots on the ground with extending security, calling them first steps toward establishing the government's credibility. Building up Afghan government forces, he concedes, is another matter.

The same goes for Zhari district, the birthplace of the Taliban movement. There, prior to President Obama's troop surge, Afghan government forces were under siege on the main highway, to say nothing of the hinterlands. Roads had to be continuously swept with armored vehicles, and simple footpaths had to be blasted with mine-clearing explosives to allow patrols to continue on their way. Since the latest wave of NATO operations, local elders say militant commanders seem to have abandoned the area, leaving behind disorganized ranks of foot soldiers who have grown timid in their absence. In interviews with other media sources, midlevel Taliban commanders have acknowledged the command and control setbacks there.

Still, many complain that, given the large-scale destruction and civilian casualties, it's hard for local residents to wholeheartedly embrace the U.S. presence. Mohammad Hassan, 25, a farmer from Mishan village, says he and his family had to move three times because of rolling violence. One day, after the farmer and his family had returned to their village, U.S. forces were patrolling the area around Hassan's home when the troops received fire and responded with a mortar attack. A stray armament landed inside Hassan's compound, he says, shredding his mother's arm with shrapnel. The family took her to Pakistan for treatment, he explains, before again returning to their home in the battle zone. They had no other place to go, he says. The trauma has left a residue of fear. "I don't feel completely secure with U.S. forces because they don't always recognize the difference between Taliban and civilians," says Hassan. "Our women and children are scared more."

It's a common grievance. Haji Fazel Mohammad, a member of the Zhari district council, says that in his community, two people were killed and more than 40 letters received over damaged property. One was from Abdul Khaliq, 60, of the Pashmul area, who says that although no relatives were harmed, his home, irrigation pumps and stock rooms were crushed by coalition bombs, leaving his family bereft of a cash crop and a livelihood next year. "The Americans left nothing," he says, "not even the tree stumps." Khaliq has twice traveled to the district center seeking compensation and is convinced that Afghan officials are too corrupt to offer any money — if, indeed, they have any to offer. For now, without the time or means to rebuild, he's had to decamp to a friend's home in a nearby village to sit out the harsh winter.

U.S. military officials do not deny that heavy-handed tactics were used in hotly contested parts of these districts, saying they were necessary to remove militant sanctuaries and lethal booby traps in unexpected places. The U.S. says it had to destroy the tree line from which the Taliban liked to stage attacks. At this point, the American military is confident that a sustained presence — frequent patrols, new military outposts, greater troop density — coupled with reconstruction projects, better local governance and more capable Afghan security forces will reassure residents. The plan is to dig in, not move on. "We can now consolidate our gains and further reduce [the Taliban's] ability to maintain sanctuary" in the future, says a U.S. officer. "The intent is to be much more active and press whatever enemy remains."

So long as the Americans stick around, some Afghans in Kandahar hold that the adjustments could make a difference. The provisional 2014 timetable to hand over security duties to Afghan forces appears to have had a positive impact on public perceptions. Yet even if the coming months are used to tighten security and prevent insurgents from filtering back to old strongholds, it won't be possible to gauge the full impact of the Kandahar offensive until the spring, when fighting resumes. And if the best-case scenario holds and the Taliban is weaker than before, the coalition will still have to contend with festering local anger over the loss of homes, jobs and loved ones. All of that is poised to harden as the current winter deepens.