Powell had warned before the speech that he'd unveil no new policy positions, and he kept his word. Clearly visible, too, was the effect of the umpteen rewrites required by the Bush administration's internal debate over just how far Washington should push the Israelis — gone, for example, was the principle, mentioned in earlier versions leaked via the Israeli media, that the two sides would have to share Jerusalem. Also absent was any criticism of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's insistence on seven days of quiet before cease-fire terms could be implemented, despite Washington's reported impatience with that demand.
Land for peace, peace for land
To be sure, Sharon welcomed the speech as a positive contribution, and the Israelis chose to focus on Powell's harsh criticism of the Palestinian intifada and his insistence that Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat produce "real results, not just words and declarations" in acting immediately to stop attacks on Israelis. Powell, the Israelis say, has put the ball in Arafat's court.
While the Palestinians were disappointed by the absence of any mention of timetables, there were certainly consolations in the speech for Arafat to hold onto. Powell harshly criticized Israel's settlement policy and closures of Palestinian areas in the West Bank and Gaza, and twice used the word "occupation" to describe Israel's presence in those territories. Then again, that's less of a policy shift than a dash of rhetorical candor — the U.N. resolutions on which the Oslo peace process was based and which Powell once again invoked as the very basis of a peace deal require Israel to withdraw from territories it has occupied since 1967 in exchange for a recognition of its right to security. In other words, as ever, land for peace.
Two states
Powell essentially reprised the Mitchell Commission's recommendations for a cease-fire and confidence-building mechanisms and a resumption of negotiations over a long-term settlement. Such a settlement, said Powell, would see "two states, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognized borders." There's nothing new in that, either — a two-state solution to the conflict was the very basis of Oslo — or in his call for the two sides to negotiate a solution to the questions of Jerusalem and the fate of Palestinian refugees. The two sides agreed in 1994 to negotiate on those issues as part of the "final status" talks prescribed by the Oslo Accord. Ariel Sharon, who opposed Oslo from the outset and still maintains that it was Israel's biggest-ever mistake, has vowed never to negotiate over Jerusalem. But he may have to if he's serious about a peace agreement.
There's been an epic gap between what Arafat has been willing to accept at the negotiating table, and what he's told his own people and the wider Arab world. And that gap became even more dangerous in the wake of Camp David's failure, when the Palestinian leader turned for support to the wider Arab world and to the most militant elements on his own streets. That instantly narrowed his space for compromise on Jerusalem and on the refugee issue, and if anything his room for maneuver has shrunk over the year of the intifada. And on the Israeli side, too, the appetite for compromise with Arafat is gone, and Sharon's own hawkishness is heartily endorsed by an electorate traumatized by the intifada. The impact of a year of low-intensity warfare on public opinion on both sides of the divide has further dimmed the prospects for peace.
General Zinni's long journey
Both sides accept the Mitchell Report in principle, although each has a different understanding of it what it requires of themselves and their adversary (and in what order). And each side has different, even mutually exclusive needs, for calming the situation. Sharon insists on an end to violence before he'll even begin discussions, saying to do any less would be to reward Palestinian violence. But Arafat will only act against violence if he can point Palestinians to a clearly visible mechanism for ending the occupation by peaceful means. That's because while the Bush administration and the Israelis call it terrorism, most Palestinians and even Washington's Arab allies see such violence as an inevitable, even justified response to the occupation.
The task of finding a way around that logjam has fallen to retired Marine General Anthony Zinni, who is being sent to the region by Powell to knock heads and twist arms, with orders to remain there until a cease-fire is in place. But the Secretary of State showed a healthy compassion by letting his emissary enjoy the Thanksgiving weekend at home before embarking on his mission. Because it may be some time before General Zinni is next in these parts.