President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad addresses a public gathering in Birjand, the eastern provincial capital of Iran.
The Bush Administration's regime-change rhetoric and $75 million a year democracy-promotion plan skirts an unpalatable reality about Iran: Even within the limits imposed on it by the clerical authorities, the Islamic Republic's political system is among the most democratic in the Muslim Middle East. By comparison, a key U.S. ally such as Saudi Arabia has no elected national legislature to speak of, while in Egypt — another long-standing American partner — the people have no meaningful voice in the People's Assembly. Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq have parliaments of great promise, but all are gravely undermined or even totally paralyzed by factionalism and violence. By contrast, in Iran later this week some 20 million voters will select a new 290-seat parliament, called the Majlis ash-Shoura Eslami, whose makeup may well alter the course of Iranian foreign and domestic policies — and determine the political future of hard-line President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Iranian democracy, of course, is deeply — some would say fatally — flawed. The constitution provides for competitive elections at the national and local level, but incorporates a complex system of checks and balances that requires unelected clerics to vet candidates. And, as has become tradition, the conservative-controlled Council of Guardians and other bodies have used that authority to disqualify hundreds of moderate reformists and even some conservative centrists from running in the March 14 election. The move prompted outrage from former two-term President Mohammed Khatami, a reformist leader, who denounced the move as a "catastrophe." Even some conservatives fear that such blatant rigging of the poll undermines the Islamic Republic's claim to legitimacy based on a popular mandate.
Nonetheless, as Iranian political scientist Farideh Farhi puts it, Iranian elections remain "colorful and rather intense exercises in elite competition." The scheme to elbow out Iranian reformists, who controlled parliament from 2000 to 2004, and the ferocity with which the election is being contested, actually underline the importance of this week's balloting. Besides functioning as a political scrum between competing personalities and factions, it will serve as a referendum on Ahmadinejad's tenure that could either strengthen or damage his hopes of winning a second term in next year's presidential elections.
Despite the Bush Administration's caricature of Ahmadinejad as an evil dictator, Iranian politics is a constant, volatile struggle to achieve influence and position, even for Iran's president. (Final executive authority in Iran, particularly over matters of foreign policy and national security, rests not with the president, but with the clerical Supreme Leader, currently Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, although the day to day running of the government is in the hands of the elected president.) Ahmadinejad has proved himself to be an agenda-setter who has often outmaneuvered his opponents — his victory-lap state visit to Iraq last week, where he was warmly received by the government, may have been another maneuver to build up his domestic political support.
Yet, his brash style and ideologically driven policies have gotten him into as much trouble with domestic rivals as they have with foreign critics. Having won the presidency on the basis of chicken-in-every-pot election promises, Ahmadinejad's failure to deliver better living standards could come back to haunt him. His economic management efforts are blamed by critics for double-digit inflation that has badly hit the country's large middle class, and in last year's municipal elections, Ahmadinejad's slate of candidates fared poorly across the country.
A clear sign of Ahmadinejad's political difficulties is his decision to avoid fielding his own slate of candidates this time and instead aligning with a conservative coalition, the Unified Principlist Front. But disunity in conservative ranks has become increasingly apparent. Rival coalitions of "principlists" — dubbed for their supposed fealty to the principles of the 1979 Islamic Revolution — have been formed by such influential figures as Tehran Mayor Mohammed Qalibaf, former national security chief Ali Larijani, erstwhile head of the Revolutionary Guards Mohsen Rezaie, and former intelligence chief Ali Fallahian.
Another challenge to Ahmadinejad comes from a loose coalition of centrists and reformists led by Khatami, former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and ex-Speaker Mehdi Karroubi. Due to the disqualification of many of its candidates, however, this bloc has little chance of winning a majority in the majlis. Still, despite its unity fraying in the final weeks of campaigning, it could do well enough to challenge or defeat Ahmadinejad's policy initiatives during the remaining year of his presidential term.
If the direction of Iran's economic and domestic policies are the prime concern of Iranian voters in the March 14 ballot — and next year's presidential race — their outcome could certainly have an impact on the international standoff over Iran's nuclear energy program, and the future of Tehran's relations with Western governments who suspect that its ultimate goal is to construct a nuclear weapon.
While Ahmadinejad has used the nationalist appeal of the nuclear issue to rally support, his political rivals have increasingly criticized his hard-line positions and radical rhetoric against Israel for undermining Iran's international standing, and thus damaging Iranian interests. The parliamentary vote, severely truncated though the choices on offer may be, nonetheless gives Iranian voters the chance to weigh in on the direction being pursued by Ahmadinejad. That's why its outcome bears close scrutiny by the U.S. and its allies.
"Election periods are important revelatory moments regarding the push and pull of Iranian politics," Farhi explains. Last week, the U.N. Security Council voted a third round of sanctions against Iran over its refusal to suspend uranium-enrichment activities, but nobody expects those sanctions to change Tehran's nuclear stance. Peacefully resolving the standoff may yet depend on Iranian leaders, influenced by popular sentiment, deciding to take a direction different from the confrontational approach that Ahmadinejad has chosen.
The Bush Administration's regime-change rhetoric and $75 million a year democracy-promotion plan skirts an unpalatable reality about Iran: Even within the limits imposed on it by the clerical authorities, the Islamic Republic's political system is among the most democratic in the Muslim Middle East. By comparison, a key U.S. ally such as Saudi Arabia has no elected national legislature to speak of, while in Egypt — another long-standing American partner — the people have no meaningful voice in the People's Assembly. Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq have parliaments of great promise, but all are gravely undermined or even totally paralyzed by factionalism and violence. By contrast, in Iran later this week some 20 million voters will select a new 290-seat parliament, called the Majlis ash-Shoura Eslami, whose makeup may well alter the course of Iranian foreign and domestic policies — and determine the political future of hard-line President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Iranian democracy, of course, is deeply — some would say fatally — flawed. The constitution provides for competitive elections at the national and local level, but incorporates a complex system of checks and balances that requires unelected clerics to vet candidates. And, as has become tradition, the conservative-controlled Council of Guardians and other bodies have used that authority to disqualify hundreds of moderate reformists and even some conservative centrists from running in the March 14 election. The move prompted outrage from former two-term President Mohammed Khatami, a reformist leader, who denounced the move as a "catastrophe." Even some conservatives fear that such blatant rigging of the poll undermines the Islamic Republic's claim to legitimacy based on a popular mandate.
Nonetheless, as Iranian political scientist Farideh Farhi puts it, Iranian elections remain "colorful and rather intense exercises in elite competition." The scheme to elbow out Iranian reformists, who controlled parliament from 2000 to 2004, and the ferocity with which the election is being contested, actually underline the importance of next week's balloting. Besides functioning as a political scrum between competing personalities and factions, it will serve as a referendum on Ahmadinejad's tenure that could either strengthen or damage his hopes of winning a second term in next year's presidential elections.
Despite the Bush Administration's caricature of Ahmadinejad as an evil dictator, Iranian politics is a constant, volatile struggle to achieve influence and position, even for Iran's president. (Final executive authority in Iran, particularly over matters of foreign policy and national security, rests not with the president, but with the clerical Supreme Leader, currently Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, although the day to day running of the government is in the hands of the elected president.) Ahmadinejad has proved himself to be an agenda-setter who has often outmaneuvered his opponents — his victory-lap state visit to Iraq this week, where he was warmly received by the government, may have been another maneuver to build up his domestic political support.
Yet, his brash style and ideologically driven policies have gotten him into as much trouble with domestic rivals as they have with foreign critics. Having won the presidency on the basis of chicken-in-every-pot election promises, Ahmadinejad's failure to deliver better living standards could come back to haunt him. His economic management efforts are blamed by critics for double-digit inflation that has badly hit the country's large middle class, and in last year's municipal elections, Ahmadinejad's slate of candidates fared poorly across the country.
A clear sign of Ahmadinejad's political difficulties is his decision to avoid fielding his own slate of candidates this time and instead aligning with a conservative coalition, the Unified Principlist Front. But disunity in conservative ranks has become increasingly apparent. Rival coalitions of "principlists" — dubbed for their supposed fealty to the principles of the 1979 Islamic Revolution — have been formed by such influential figures as Tehran Mayor Mohammed Qalibaf, former national security chief Ali Larijani, erstwhile head of the Revolutionary Guards Mohsen Rezaie, and former intelligence chief Ali Fallahian.
Another challenge to Ahmadinejad comes from a loose coalition of centrists and reformists led by Khatami, former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and ex-Speaker Mehdi Karroubi. Due to the disqualification of many of its candidates, however, this bloc has little chance of winning a majority in the majlis. Still, despite its unity fraying in the final weeks of campaigning, it could do well enough to challenge or defeat Ahmadinejad's policy initiatives during the remaining year of his presidential term.
If the direction of Iran's economic and domestic policies are the prime concern of Iranian voters in the March 14 ballot — and next year's presidential race — their outcome could certainly have an impact on the international standoff over Iran's nuclear energy program, and the future of Tehran's relations with Western governments who suspect that its ultimate goal is to construct a nuclear weapon.
While Ahmadinejad has used the nationalist appeal of the nuclear issue to rally support, his political rivals have increasingly criticized his hard-line positions and radical rhetoric against Israel for undermining Iran's international standing, and thus damaging Iranian interests. Next week's parliamentary vote, severely truncated though the choices on offer may be, nonetheless gives Iranian voters the chance to weigh in on the direction being pursued by Ahmadinejad. That's why its outcome bears close scrutiny by the U.S. and its allies.
"Election periods are important revelatory moments regarding the push and pull of Iranian politics," Farhi explains. Last week, the U.N. Security Council voted a third round of sanctions against Iran over its refusal to suspend uranium-enrichment activities, but nobody expects those sanctions to change Tehran's nuclear stance. Peacefully resolving the standoff may yet depend on Iranian leaders, influenced by popular sentiment, deciding to take a direction different from the confrontational approach that Ahmadinejad has chosen.