Agreeing on the final 10%, though, is proving difficult. That's because India insists on its right to reprocess spent fuel and demands access to reprocessing technology. Reprocessing, however, yields plutonium, which can be used both to fuel reactors and for making bombs. Under its "Separation Plan," India says fuel purchased abroad for civilian purposes will not be diverted for military uses, but some in the U.S. fear that accepting India's demand for reprocessing rights and technology will increase its strategic nuclear capabilities.
Also, while India has declared a unilateral moratorium on further testing, Delhi wants to reserve the right to conduct further weapons tests should it choose to, and it wants the U.S. to guarantee that its nuclear fuel supplies from American companies are not conditional on India's refraining from testing. But U.S. negotiators want Delhi to agree to a test ban, and to make the fuel supply conditional on adhering to that ban.
Both sides have expended much effort domestically to win over detractors. Opposition to the deal in the U.S. comes mainly from non-proliferation advocates who argue that the deal could trigger a nuclear arms race in South Asia and even with China, and will encourage continued defiance of the non-proliferation system by Iran and North Korea.
In India, nuclear scientists, leftist parties and opposition BJP nationalists have opposed the deal, citing concerns over national security, technological self-sufficiency and sovereignty. And their claim that the deal could have a negative impact on India's independent foreign policy were boosted earlier this month when U.S. lawmakers led by California Democratic congressman Tom Lantos wrote to Prime Minister Manhmohan Singh warning that India's close relations with Iran could negatively impact the future of the deal.
Officials meeting in London over the last two days have reportedly made little headway, but both sides are eager to make further progress before President George W. Bush meets Singh on the G8 sidelines in Germany on June 7. For that to happen, says Burns, both countries will need to make some "compromises."
Both sides have plenty of incentive to cut a deal. Beyond getting access for U.S. companies to India's $100 billion civil nuclear energy market, the Bush Administration has prioritized deepening U.S.-India ties based on India's potential as an economic powerhouse and a strategic counterweight to China. For India , the deal offers an end to decades of nuclear isolation, which is a precondition for its energy security and technological advancement — and, most importantly, it affirms India's great-power aspirations.
It is for this combination of incentives on both sides, says Ashley J. Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace — who has played a key behind-the-scenes role in the talks — that the deal will come through. Speaking on the sidelines of a lecture in New Delhi recently, he said it was not a matter of "if" but "when."
"Neither side can give in much," says P.R. Chari, research professor at the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies in New Delhi, who has been following the deal, "but both have highly skilled negotiators. The solution may lie in some clever language." Clever enough to persuade skeptics on both sides that their concerns have been answered.