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It is hard to overstate just how much the Abu Ghraib scandal still resonates with Iraqis. As a journalist, I am constantly reminded of it by Iraqis I meetwhether in the high offices of the Green Zone or in the streets of Baghdad. Those who resent the U.S. presence in Iraq never tire of using it as a flogging horse; even today, statements and videos issued by insurgent groups and jihadi organizations routinely cite Abu Ghraib, along with Haditha and Mahmoudiya, as proof of America's malign intentions in Iraq. Sgt Cardona's return "will give the insurgents another pretext for their insurgency," predicts Sadiq al-Mussawi, a political analyst. "And in this instance, many Iraqis will agree with them."
Even America's allies here bring up Abu Ghraib all the time, as proof of how little the U.S. understands Iraq. Last year, a European diplomat told me the infamous Abu Ghraib photossome of them featuring Sgt Cardona"did more damage to U.S. credibility in Iraq than a Cruise missile smashing into a kindergarden."
For many Iraqis, the punishment meted out to those found guilty of atrocities in the prison was too lenient; and Sgt. Cardona's return only confirmed suspicions that the U.S. military never took the case seriously. A top Iraqi military commander, trained and appointed to his high position by the U.S., once told me that the Americans should have made an example of all those found guilty by "cutting of their heads and displaying them at the entrance of the Green Zone." This, from a man who proudly labeled himself as a "friend of America."
The timing of Sgt Cardona's return could not have been worse. Anti-American sentiment in Iraq is at an all-time high, and opinion polls show that most Iraqisregardless of sect or ethnicitywant the U.S. forces out of their country. Hatred for the U.S. military runs deep among the minority Sunnis, whose centuries-old grip on power ended with the fall of Saddam Hussein; Sunni resentment fuels the insurgency that has raged ever since.