(2 of 3)
But from the first day of his administration on Sept. 26, Abe pushed hard
to
reopen diplomatic channels with both Beijing and Seoul, making very public
overtures for early summit meetings. It was a political gamble for the
untested
Abe, but to the surprise of many, both countries proved receptive. "This
was
ultimately China and South Korea's choice, and that shows there is a
willingness on all three sides to get beyond the breakdown of the Koizumi
years," says Cook. During Koizumi's time, both China and South Korea had
insisted that the Japanese Prime Minister promise to forego Yasukuni visits
before relations could be normalized. Though Abe himself has visited
Yasukuni
often in the past, he has refused to
say
whether he intends to go there as Prime Minister. Both Beijing and Seoul seem
to be
willing to not ask if Abe won't tell, at least for now. "It was a sudden
and
unexpected outbreak of pragmatism," says Peter Beck, Seoul-based director
of
the International Crisis Group's Northeast Asia project.
Few concrete results were achieved at either summit, aside from a
reiterating
the importance of increasing dialogue on a range of issues that divide
Japan
from its neighbors, including World War II history, Japan's status in the
United
Nations and disputes over gas and oil exploration in the East China Sea.
But
the simple fact that lines of communication were opened that the Japanese
Prime Minister could be giving a 21-gun military salute in Beijing was a
necessary accomplishment. Chinese President Hu Jintao told Abe that his
visit
was a "turning point in China-Japan relations." Abe's decision to make
China
his debut abroad Japanese leaders traditionally travel to Washington
first and
Beijing's willingness to make time for Tokyo during the opening of China's
annual Communist Party Central Committee meeting showed the importance that
both sides attach to the relationship. "This is more than just symbolic,"
says
Cook. "Both sides want to look forward."