Why China Will be Bush's Toughest Test

Jay Branegan: The decision over whether to sell these vessels to Taiwan was always going to be President Bush's first tough foreign policy decision. The Chinese are taking a really hard line. When asked in New York yesterday if China might consider a military response, Qian didn't rule it out, and warned that the sale of these vessels could provoke an international crisis. So Beijing is going to raise a pretty high level of bluff and bluster on this issue.

Part of this may be to test the new administration. But the Chinese perceive the Aegis as the first step to extending a missile shield to Taiwan, and they're extremely concerned to avoid this.

Taiwan has always been the wild card in relations between Beijing and successive U.S. administrations. How will this administration deal with the question?

Taiwan is not the basis of U.S.-China relations, although right now the two sides may be trying to establish new terms. Originally, the relationship was cemented on the basis of a common hostility to the Soviet Union. But these days that's no longer a factor, and Beijing is talking about a strategic alliance with Moscow.

Trade and economics now the basis of the relationship. But it is always said that for the Chinese, politics will trump economics. They may be willing to sacrifice a lot in order to get Taiwan back. And, of course, there are internal struggles between hawks and doves in Beijing, just as there are in Washington. Many Republicans accuse the Clinton administration of selling out Taiwan to appease China. So this will be an important test for the Bush administration both at home and abroad.

So what is the thinking in the administration over how to deal with the Taiwan arms request?

There are two schools of thought. One is that selling Taiwan the Aegis is a real poke in the eye for Beijing, and a terrible way to start a new relationship. There may be ways to finesse the issue without being so blatant. The opposing view is that this is Bush's first big test. He made a big point during the campaign of declaring that China was a competitor, not a partner, and now China is testing the new president. Adherents of this way of thinking argue that China has unwisely made an issue of the Aegis sale, because if President Bush backs down now his stature will diminish in the region, and internationally.

There is a "third way," which argues that Washington should immediately make available four Kidd-class destroyers, which don't have the same capability as the Aegis, and then make a contingency agreement to supply Taiwan with the Aegis vessels down the road if this is necessitated by China's military posture. The objective, then, would be to give the Chinese a chance to withdraw their missiles from the Taiwan Strait. Right now, it looks likely that the administration will go for some version of the third option.

What else is on the agenda?

National missile defense. The Chinese are very concerned that the proposed U.S. missile shield will neutralize their small nuclear deterrent. Of course, it's hard to imagine the Americans agreeing to modify their system to let the Chinese maintain the capacity to incinerate Los Angeles. With the Russians we can argue that it won't affect their nuclear deterrent, but there doesn't seem to be any way around the fact that if we build a system designed to counter the threat from rogue states, that would effectively negate China's nuclear arsenal, simply because it's so small. And that opens a whole can of worms.

What about the economic relationship? China provides a massive share of the manufactured goods currently consumed in the U.S. Presumably, signs of economic slowdown must introduce further strains into an already troubled trade relationship?

Yes, the primary concern for the Chinese is getting immediate access to the World Trade Organization, while the U.S. is insisting that the Chinese have not yet met the conditions required for their admission. That remains a source of conflict.

But in a wider sense, the new administration hasn't yet made up its mind about China. Everyone agrees that China is a growing regional power, but there are different ideas as to whether that should be perceived as a threat to U.S. interests, or whether the relationship can be managed to mutual advantage. Many people in the Bush administration believe at a very emotional level that the rise of China is a great threat to the U.S. and read the relationship in that way. But Bush's instincts are a lot like his father's, even if some of his advisers are more hawkish. He'll allow the possibility both of cooperation and of conflict when the two sides disagree.

So Qian is unlikely to walk away happy from his White House visit?

Unlikely. Bush will be businesslike but realistic. He doesn't want to anger the Chinese, but also wants to send a clear message that we're willing to cooperate, but we're also expect certain behavior in terms of proliferation, human rights and other issues. The administration is going to speak bluntly so that there are no misunderstandings. And the Chinese can be expected to bluster and huff and puff for a time. But it may be some time before the substance of the relationship becomes clear. And the Aegis directions will be an important decision and set the tone for the future relationship.