But Powell is a smooth operator, and he has plenty of persuasive arrows in his quiver. For starters, he'll make clear to detractors that the sanctions are on the verge of collapse, with some of Washington's key regional allies such as Egypt concluding free trade agreements with Baghdad, and that salvaging an deal to tighten controls on Iraq's access to weapons is about the best Washington can hope for. After all, the success of sanctions depends less on the demeanor of Congress than on the actions of Iraq's neighbors, where the Republican hard line finds very little echo. Powell will point to the agreement by Syria's President Bashar Assad to stop paying Baghdad directly for oil pumped through his country as a sign that Saddam's neighbors are ready to play ball if they believe Washington is pursuing a sound strategy. The problem, of course, is that the Arab states who lined up behind the U.S. in the Gulf War for the most part don't believe that a proxy war to overthrow Saddam is a sound strategy — they have serious doubts, echoed by many in the Pentagon, about the abilities of a loose and diverse coalition of opposition groups to defeat the dictatorship, much less of the notion that such an outcome would actually enhance regional stability.
The issue of overthrowing Saddam may be the trickiest part for Powell: While it's U.S. policy, as enshrined in the Iraq Liberation Act, toppling the regime in Baghdad never been the policy of the United Nations or of the Gulf War coalition. And, of course, the legislators may be keen to hear what other ideas the secretary of state may have if they're to swallow a significantly softer sanctions regime. There, Powell may be in a bit of a box. While he can ritually intone the mantra of taking steps to change the regime in Baghdad, he also has to be concerned that this is a policy option that causes concern among the Arab states on whom Washington must rely to enforce the arms embargo. Powell may envisage a policy of long-term containment of Saddam, but that's not going to sound particularly appealing to the Capitol Hill hawks who want to finish what the Gulf War began. Still, Powell may have an overwhelming advantage over his critics: Like the Gulf War itself, the policy of long-term containment is a lot more likely than a stepped-up proxy war to win all-important Arab support.
With reporting by Jay Branegan/Washington