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Cheney and Eagleburger agreed. Scowcroft had taken this position within hours of the invasion. "We're committed to Saudi Arabia,'' the President said. We could start alerting units to be prepared to defend the country.
I then asked if it was worth going to war to liberate Kuwait. It was a Clausewitzian question, which I posed so that the military would know what preparations it might have to make. I detected a chill in the room. The question was premature, and it should not have come from me. I had overstepped; I was only supposed to give military advice. Nevertheless, as National Security Adviser for Ronald Reagan, I had wrestled with the politics and economics of crises for almost two years in the White House, in this very room. I had participated in superpower summits. More to the point, as a midlevel career officer, I had been appalled at the docility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, fighting the war in Vietnam without ever pressing the political leaders to lay out clear objectives for them. Before we start talking about how many divisions, carriers and fighter wings we need, I said, we have to ask, to achieve what end? But the question was not answered before the meeting broke up.
Later that day, President Bush and Scowcroft spoke with Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi ambassador to the U.S. and an old racquetball partner of mine. They wanted Bandar to understand the threat his country faced and to know that we were prepared to come to its aid. Afterward, Scowcroft called Cheney. Bandar was coming over, he said, and we were to give him another dose of reality. On his arrival at Cheney's office, Bandar played his usual Americanized, jaunty fighter-pilot role, drinking coffee from a foam cup and stirring it with a gold pen. Ordinarily, we addressed each other in terms bordering on the obscene, with my printable favorites including "Bandar the Magnificent" and "Bandar, you Arab Gatsby," while he called me "Milord." This day we did not kid around.
"We're ready to help you defend yourselves from Saddam," Cheney said.
Bandar gave us a look of bemused skepticism. "Like Jimmy Carter did?" He was referring to an earlier crisis in which President Carter had come to Saudi Arabia's aid with unarmed F-15 aircraft.
"Tell Prince Bandar what we are prepared to do," Cheney said to me.
"We'll start by bringing in the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing," I began, "and the 82d Airborne, and a carrier." I kept adding follow-up units.
Bandar's interest quickened, and he interrupted me. "What's that add up to?" he asked.
"All told," I said, "about 100,000 troops, for starters."
"I see," Bandar said. "You are serious."
"We suggest you urge King Fahd to accept our offer to protect the kingdom," Cheney concluded. Bandar left, assuring us that he was on his way to report what we had advised.
After he was gone, Cheney brought up our earlier meeting with the President. "Colin," he said, "you're Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. You're not Secretary of State. You're not the National Security Adviser anymore. And you're not Secretary of Defense. So stick to military matters." He made clear that I had taken liberty for license. I was not sorry, however, that I had spoken out at the White House. What I had said about giving the military clear objectives had to be said.